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Philosophically, a repertoire of signifying practices as constitutive of a cultural endowment was said to be 
ambiguous or unworthy of pursuit. Currently, a unique capacity of the mind is considered to be its ability 
to produce a digital infinity. The infinity produced, here an operation expressing subjectivity, follows a 
simple principle according to which a limited set of means, here functions, are utilized to produce an 
infinite range of potentially meaningful expressions. It is from this concept that I propose a theory of 
subjectivity and the endowment from which it expresses a self in the world(s) it participates. In particular, 
I make a case for the subjectivity of blackness. I treat subjectivity as an operation in order to address 
problems with Identity theory, Afro-Pessimism, and to formalize an analysis of blackness despite the 
onto-epistemological commitments of racialized systems of categorization. In sum, subjectivity will be 
characterized as poetic computation.  
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. . .us colored folk are like branches without roots,  
and that makes for things come round in queer ways.  
 –Zora Neale Hurston 
 
In 1963, Amiri Baraka, then LeRoi Jones, stated that modes of expression are modes of being in the 
world. In this vein, he said the mode of expression of blackness is exhibited by the blues. As blues people, 
the finite means of that repertoire were put to infinite use and become embedded in almost every musical 
form in the Americas (Peterson II, 2018; Rapport, 2014; Johnson, 1925) and rebounded to areas globally, 
setting the conditions for a black form of life to emerge. This essay will take this articulation seriously. In 
his work on improvisation syntax and scat Brent Hayes Edwards (2002) stated that scat began with a fall; 
a subject’s musical expression articulated outside of strict adherence to notation. Thus, blackness is 
shown to be able to articulate a self and maintain subject continuity outside of strict categorization made 
interchangeable with one identity or another. Here lies where we can make a start towards a theory of 
subjectivity that averts the failings of identity theory. Subjectivity is the projection of this innate creative 
capacity, thus the only innateness to be had is an operation, not an essential thing as identity purports. An 
operation that constructs one’s own and, therefore, can impose on others an identifier such that the use, 
the function of that name entails that subjectivity is primary, not the system of categorization it just so 
happens to become a part. 
 
The concept of a cultural endowment represents the lexicon from which a form of life is constructed. 
What is articulated from this endowment has been central to Black study since the 19thc. The development 
of this concept is integral to positing a continuity of expression whose operation is Black subjectivity. 
This endowment has been posited both as an affinity of signifying practices (Gates, 1988; Hurston, 1934) 
and as a coalition constructed by way of one’s mode of being in the world. (Baraka, 1963) Modes of 
expression are the means of articulation from endowments. As a mode of expression, blackness is 
considered a capacity, not a thing (Spencer, 2014) its operation indicative of subjectivity. The method 
with which it constructs the form of life it expresses can be shown actively constructing that world. 
(Gödel, 1941; Jones/Baraka, 1963; Wittgenstein, 1922) The problem of blackness is a problem for 
thought (Chandler, 2013), thus set-theoretical construction, as a way of manipulating the objects of 
thought, (Cantor, 1874) give us an entry point for the study of the functions whose operation expresses 
the concept of subjectivity.  
 
We start with modes of expression. For Jones/Baraka, modes of expression are the expression of a people. 
As such, in accordance with Wittgenstein, the expression is of a form of life. Blackness from here on is 
not merely the predicament of an absolutist determination of a group, but an affinity obtained between 
modes of expression indicative of the active construction of a form of life. This is in excess, not just in 
reaction to an imposed predicament of strict categorization—whether racial, national, or geographic. 
Blackness will be considered as a disjoint union of multiple signifying practices, indicating cultural and 
ethnic antecedents that are not centrally placed, but based on that affinity between the operations 
constructing them. Expressing and, therefore, forming the endowment I wish to illustrate. As a faculty of 
subjectivity, the formulation of this capacity is the closest we get to making an account of subjectivity as 
functional, indicated by the relation obtained between input and output claims. (Chomsky, 2015) This, 
then, composes a relation between subject and context because the capacities of subjectivity are the means 
of context construction.  
 
We start here in opposition to a presupposed categorical description. To commit the latter would make 
subjectivity a byproduct of identity without accounting for what identity actually identifies. Ultimately, 
this leaves us with the question, what constructed that identity in the first place? And if by some other, by 
what means? And if by some context, how was the constructed context determined? With that being said, 
there are three factors that must be accounted for in order to come up with an adequate explanation of 
what a cultural endowment is with regard to the activity of the subject constructing it.  
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The first factor deals with the data available. Theorist Marvin Minsky (1967) once constructed two-state 
Turing Machines allowed to run utilizing two symbols to code input and output.1 Most produced nothing. 
However, from no one thing, and limited external stipulations, a recursive successor-function emerged, 
creating different orders of data from the finite means available. In terms of modes of expression, the 
successor-function modeled merge, the primary operation for the language faculty. Language is not what 
comes out of one’s mouth, but the mechanism for creating thought. From this, we arrive at a natural 
starting point to make an account of subjectivity. Stephen Wolfram (1991) theorized a two state, three 
symbol machine proven universal by Alex Smith. (2007)2 The two state, three symbol machine—A,B 
states with symbols 0,1,2—revealed that decidable problems are only such after the construction of a 
reference frame. A yes/no determination is relative to the context of application, the model of the data 
constructed by some such operation. Considered ordinals, “1” determines the name of context, {0}=1, 
from an initial state, 0; and 2, as the set {0,{0}}={0,1}, constructs a relation between input and output. 
The function constructed is applicable independently of any stipulated norm. As such, the emergent 
operation is recursive. The finding from the difference that emerged between [2,2] and [2,3] models 
showed that causation is not identical with correlation between data and the categorical system brought to 
the data set. If there are only two symbols the context is assumed, therefore indeterminate. By adding a 
third symbol, a frame of reference indicates the construction of the context in which this operation can be 
discerned by its activity. So we can understand a normative concept explained by non-normative means, 
applicable without the norm determined beforehand. The ability to take two objects and make a third 
without losing the former, indicates the initial state of subjectivity is null when considered from a position 
external to context; and yet, as it is a function, its zero may be null, but its content is this internal creative 
capacity constructing the context it inhabits. Constructability is easily shown by Hasse diagrams with the 
subject occupying the null position, lines as functions, and nodes as constructs from those functions. 
From that diagram, the shape of the subject’s reality as the relation between functions, its mode of 
expression as its way of being in the world it constructs, can be illustrated. From this we state that a 
marker of subjectivity is the ability to make infinite use of finite means.  
 
Now our second factor. Subjectivity is expressed by a recursive operation that creates objects appropriate 
to data but not necessarily caused by the data, therefore not random. With this understanding in tow, our 
third factor brings us to an explication of what a cultural endowment entails. If it can be shown that this 
individual capacity holds, then what would be the case of a collective capacity? As a successor-function 
can be elucidated by set-theoretical construction, a composite function based on the product of this 
individual capacity is likely. In this way, the subject making use of finite means can produce identities 
appropriate to context but not necessarily caused by that context. This aids us in understanding why it 
may be the case that an identity has not been experienced before. Taking into account that subjectivity is 
an operation, these identities are not seen as random or arbitrary but are the result of a particular operation 
whose function indicates the modality in which the entities of this particular endowment are expressed. 
This is the case because those subjects actively construct that context.  
 
First we will show how subjectivity operates. By that operation it constructs the contexts, the realities, in 
which it inhabits. Then we will show how the accumulated contexts, realities, for the worlds a subject 
inhabits, are constructed by that same or other subjects, prove an endowment from which that operation 
pulls in order to articulate identities. Identity is how that subject is in that world, appropriate to each 
context but not caused by any one context. Therefore, the subject’s articulations are not random because 
the endowment is transitive across those worlds. In this way, particular input place limits on the type of 
identity produced from the set of all possible. This subjective-operation produces different output 
                                                      
1 Computation: Finite and Infinite Machines—see their [2,2] machine.   
 
2 New Kind of Science, p. 709—see their [2,3] machine. 
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dependent upon the context in which it is situated while actively constructing it. However, as all inputs 
cause certain things to emerge, all identity constructs indicate the conditions of their emergence. As 
conditions, the context indicated by the material available to subjects and the relation they obtain with 
each other due to the function expressed by this operation, demonstrates that changes in the context also 
cause changes in the domain of their endowments. As subjectivity is indicated by the activity of identity 
construction and as identity implies a context in which its assertion is applicable, this indicates that the 
subject-operation and the domain from which it pulls to articulate a self is present before input. The type 
of entity it is in and only in that context, how it is identified, is what is context dependent. (see Appiah, 
1985)  
 
II.  
 
Now for the recursive operation expressing subjectivity. The construction of contexts indicates the 
activity of such an entity. We treat this capacity as an ordinal. The null, which assumes no one thing, can 
be shown via some operation to express any thing. Therefore, null can be found as the basis for every 
context. We take the von Neumann ordinals based on set-theoretic construction as a model of this 
operation. Starting with an object of no scope, null assumptions—e.g. a name, axiom, object of 
knowledge—we proceed in the following way,  
 
0 = “null” 
{0}= “1” 
{0, {0}}= “2” 
{0, {0}, {0, {0}}} = “3” 
 
By this method we can conceive of a relation , each ordinal constructed prior, is housed in its successor; 
each successor constructed from those prior. We can assume 0{0}=1 without changing its being 1. Thus, 
“1” is the creation of a context by the very function of this subject-operation. “2” relates subject in or to 
context, for {0, {0}}={0, 1}. Identity is substantiated within frame. The disjoint union of what is the case 
with what that assertion is not comprises the domain of all possible articulations. Identity, then, is not to 
some thing external to the operation but refers to the context of application, the context in which “1” may 
or may not be asserted. Constructs greater than 2 relate contexts with others, relation between contexts 
construct states of affairs. Identities are discernible based on their obtaining a functional role in and only 
in the context of their construction. This operation, i.e. subject, is transfinite. As the content of null, the 
zero of all possible functions, the subject, is both a part of each context by some identity and yet apart 
from each context by some other. Linking the two is the operation constructing both. The same subject 
can obtain multiple identities tied to the particular contexts in which they are applicable. The subject is a 
member of that context if it can be shown as participating in its construction. Otherwise, the identity 
asserted is inapplicable. As such, the capacities of subjectivity displayed by its activity is able to change 
contexts because it actively constructs that context with each assertion of an identity therein. The subject 
is outside of the context of identity. Identities relative to each other compose frames of categorization 
which can be shown to be constructed. In and of itself, the subject’s determinant is null. The function of 
identity is vacuous without a theory of the operation embedded in its assertion. As a null-state, 
subjectivity is no one thing. As no one thing and therefore the state from which any thing is constructed, a 
unity between contexts can be proposed.  
 
Null is at once a part of and apart from every context. Adding or taking away null from context would not 
change that context’s identity. However the context must be constructed from some state. We determine a 
function for subjectivity from s(0)=0, our constant, i.e. the function itself. From here, we state that there is 
a primitive recursive function, the “function” of a function, S, such that S(n, s(n)). This, I feel, assumes 
the least amount of stipulations. What is known by name has no scope as names are axiomatic in the 
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contexts they construct. It only has scope if and when applied. A name only has significance, then, in and 
only in the context of application.   
 
From this simple operation more complex functions can be discerned, not by stipulation, but by structure. 
Addition—the union of the elements of two or more sets—and multiplication—the summation of the 
pairs of elements from two or more sets—are possible after the formulation above. These secondary and 
tertiary operations from which identity, aggregate of entities under a label for the former, comparison 
between labels for the latter via a theory of categorization, i.e. quantification of groupings or pairs, makes 
sense. Identity theory straight off seems implausible because no one to one correlations between 
individual and category obtain by feature alone. Subjects can be part of multiple categories when features 
considered separately gain that same subject access to different category. 
 
If {0}=1 designates a collection of objects/features out of all possible, each ordinal is a determination of 
that designation. A set of groupings does not always entail the exhaustion of features from each collection 
entering that operation. Automatically we can rule out Afro pessimism, a theory that assumes Black 
identity is a cultural death. Either universal identification of blackness as interchangeable with absolute 
nothing is arbitrary—for names have no scope (Barcan-Marcus, 1961; Kripke, 1972) only the extension 
of their use or application—or that theory captures no one thing. Both result in blackness’ cultural 
endowment being non-empty. Blackness is not a thing but an operation. As such, this operation populates 
every context in which blackness participates. We will discuss Afro-Pessimism in further detail below.  
 
It is from this that we imagine that the objects considered knowledge within a particular context are 
assumed. As merely labels, tags affixed in order to define a function, they have no scope in and of 
themselves. They are axiomatic within reference frame because they cannot be proven within that frame. 
They become the basis upon which that frame is constructed. As such, a certain value is attributed to a 
name. Names are not a necessary constituent of what they label. Otherwise, we would get into a 
Russellian, if not a Gödelian, paradox: a set whose members are not self-members; or akin to the 
undecidability of a self-reflexive statement about “a”, the system in which that statement is formed.  
Identities, then, only have a function once applied in such a way that determines a reference frame or 
context-model of one’s state of affairs. One based on the material employed to construct that model.  If 
contradictions arise based on the method those names were employed in order to construct that context, 
i.e. one’s reality because of the consequences the assertion of its identity therein entails, then the model is 
seen as inconsistent. However, this inconsistency is stored as an axiom in the overall system, becoming 
that which cannot be proven in that system. Thus, null’s unification of all possible contexts is valid based 
on a sort of Boolean ring of idempodent objects. Here 0,1 decidable in 2. “2” the context or frame as the 
set {0,1}, in which 2 is expressed by the functional content of that context, but is not represented in it 
because it is the context itself, determining the discernible relation between 0,1.  
 
This unification can be shown in the following way. We can treat a label of no one thing in particular as a 
constant. Thus a of 0, a(0), represents a name as yet to be applied. We know that a(0)=0 defines the zero 
of that name-function as a constant. This formulation can describe the operation expressing this concept. 
Multiplication can be derived from addition using primitive recursion. Disjoint union, “or,” is represented 
by ‘+’; and the pair-wise aggregate of the features of each set to which a is applied by exponentiation. 
Since a+a, “0 or 0,” in accordance with Boolean methods, equals (a+a)2 then, a2+ a2+ a2. . .=a+a+a. . . 
Thus, a+a=0, for a is just a. With no stipulation, the operation of a as a being constant indicates an 
operation over null expressing no one thing as any thing. Therefore, a and a, a or a, etc. just is a. We have 
said no one thing about a which, therefore, is not related or framed by any other thing. For any x, we 
obtain the same result. If x+x=0, then this disjoint union tells us that x and not-x is null as well as for the 
conjunction, multiplication, of both. So if the ring is characterized by a power of two, we can prove the 
commutativity of this operation over null, thus relating any one context constructed from that domain. 
Commutative of subject’s over contexts, not the identities asserted within those context, i.e. rings. For x,y 
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with y=not-x. As such, xy=yx for xy+(xy+yx)=xy asserts something about x and y, namely that they are 
in a relation constructed by some operation. 
 
For any string that comes to an odd power, we discern two or more entities make up the string. We 
suppose that we have x+y just in case we discern that one of the x’s of a string x3 is not-x because (x+not-
x) could be (x+(-x)). If no one thing is said of x, all x is unified, i.e. an element, in null. Thus, a ring, 
context, is proven for x and a different ring for y. From that additional “odd” entity added to an already 
proven ring, another context can be constructed, including the one previously formed, from which a ring 
can be proven for that additional entity. We can always form another ring. If contexts are ordinally 
constructed, chains of context citation are demonstrable, thus plausible, for any assertion because an 
assertion implies the context in which it was made. If not, then the assertion is incongruent with this 
chain. The assertion is either of another or starts a new chain from null; or this is its only context, ending 
where it began because empty or self-refuting. Shown as a commutative property, wherever one is in a 
chain of contexts, an assertion can refer to a valid predecessor off of which it was constructed and, 
therefore, is applicable in this context. One can pick up the function of that assertion if one comes to be in 
a relation with it as constructive of a shared state of affairs. This lays the ground work for how 
endowments both evolve and are passed down.  
 
What is determined not-x gives us a non-determinate y such that y is the frame in which the function of x 
is expressed. Given a parameter y such that the function of x is such that, f(x~x’| y), we do not have to 
quantify in that frame. We are able to ascertain the function constructing the scope in which an operation 
of x is understood relative to y. What is determinate regarding on operation of x in respect to no one 
thing, f(0), means that no change in x can be determined on its own. That function, however, can be 
understood as an object not present in that ring but represented in the change between antecedent and 
emergent conditions. The content of the assertion “x” is the function of that expression, not x itself. For 
f(x,x) expresses no one thing about x save for that function without application. However, as the zero of 
this function, this represents  the function itself of which a change in x indicates its applicability within 
parameters set by what is not-x, thus y. We will show the import of this in our penultimate section. We 
know that this function is likely because in order to ascertain a change in x given x, we must hold what is 
not-x constant, thus y given the change observed, f(y|x~x’). There must be a limit to this frame otherwise 
change would be indiscernible. The likelihood of a function is determined by considering changes in 
observed data as a function of the parameters, the limits of what constitutes what is observed, thus 
indicating something producing those contents, of that domain. As such we see the function as the content 
of assertion made within the context set by y. 
 
The construction of a reference frame is based on the context of the appropriate application of the terms 
of knowledge. According to P.F. Strawson (1959), the objects of one’s knowledge must be discernible 
and re-identifiable within the contexts applicable. Applicability is such because these are the terms with 
which that context was constructed. A context of that context, that terms use in a successor-context, is 
valid if and only if the one prior is consistent—see Löwenheim-Skolem’s theorems and Turing’s Ordinal 
Logics. The subject’s operation over these terms of identity construction, their being put to use, indicates 
the existence of a repertoire of functions, of signifying practices that comprise a cultural endowment. 
Each function’s constant, its zero, e.g. f(0)=F, represents a term of that repertoire’s body of knowledge 
prior to application. The move from no one thing (null) to some thing (model) is based on the successor 
function above. Only in this way do we fulfill criteria for an account of the formation of an endowment. 
In this way, we obtain a plausible foundation to explain what we know (axioms) and the method of 
constructing models from that set (articulation).  
 
In what follows, we will consider cultural endowments and provide proof of its existence based on the 
conception of a workspace. We will develop this notion within the concept of a lattice representing the 
topology of the endowment whose structure is conceived as it is constructed. We will work through the 
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concept of articulation theory—the study of the conditions in which relations of subordination and 
dominance emerge—in line with Stuart Hall’s (1980) request for a formal account of this process. An 
account for the conditions in which contexts are constructed and interact is made to provide the space in 
which identities emerge due to the operation of subjectivity. Hall’s request was made in lieu of merely 
documenting or making a statistical analysis of the effects of this process, leaving the conditions which 
reproduce these relations unquestioned. It is well known in statistical study that correlation with the 
categories organizing the after-effects of this process, the events experienced, does not entail a theory of 
causation, only a description of what we already know. Subjectivity is expressed by the successor-
function modeling a merge-operation that takes from a lexicon objects of thought in order to articulate an 
identity appropriate to context but not necessarily caused by context. Therefore, subject-articulation is not 
random. The same subject can maintain its consistency while projecting multiple identities.  
 
An articulatory-operation takes two objects defined over a workspace producing another. The object 
articulated is the set of those objects that were once separate or one part of the other prior to that 
operation. This does not change the objects themselves. Based on the successor-function, this operation 
represents the creation of the successive construction of well-ordered sets. We obtain with each successor 
a context (w), in this case a workspace, an object (n), and that objects relation to/in that context (r):   
 
<w,n,r(n)> 
 
Formally, we arrive at the notation of a vector. As such, we can map the articulation of subjectivity as 
having direction and magnitude. Vector notation allows us to conceive of subjectivity as a process 
without having to make that process interchangeable with some other thing as the object of its identity. If 
this was done, we would lose the relation and concept we wished to elucidate in the first place. Our 
analysis would defeat itself on its own terms. In accordance with vector notation, the determinate, if 
subjectivity is our base, i.e. constant, is: w-n+r=0. Thus, 0 is any n, therefore no one n in particular. The 
basis for constructing models of our state of affairs is represented by the formula: n=w+r. This latter 
formulation represents a context and the means of that context’s construction. This, then, is a formula for 
discerning between subject and identity and reveals that identity has no scope until asserted within the 
context in which it is used.  
 
The method of constructing workspaces can be shown in the following way. When n=0, its assertion 
implies its context of application. Thus,  
 
n=0 
{0}=w 
{0,{0}}=r(n) 
{0,{0},{0,{0}}}= <w,n,r(n)> 
 
where r is recursive. When n=w, we can assume n=w+r(n). As the operation that models the articulation 
process, this is the union of a context and the means of that context’s construction.  
 
If we take two contexts w1=a and w2=b, we can construct an R-function such that:  
 
R(a,b,w’)→[{a,b}=c] 
 
where w’ is the workspace implied by the operation R on a,b.  In this way, [{a,b},a,b] in total is equal to 
w0 as null, the set of no one thing. As the items available to the operation, {a,b} represents the workspace 
in which “c” emerges. The items a,b are present but not represented in the successor context, [{a,b}]. 
However, because we can show how c was constructed we understand that both “c” and a,b as features of 
c exist, but in different senses. As a,b is not represented in w’, if the subject inhabits w’, its operation on 
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w’ does not have access to a,b; otherwise, contradictions arise. To manipulate the internal structure of an 
entity from an external stance writes that entity out of existence. The items a,b and their relation to each 
other expresses the subjectivity of what is subsequently identified as c by that internal relationship. Thus, 
an operation which takes up “c” as an identified object within the workspace stops at the subjectivity of c, 
the operation relating a,b, as it only takes the identity “c” as the object of subsequent operations. 
However, the subject is both a part of and remains apart from the contexts in which it inhabits. Each 
articulation creates a line of citation w1,w1’,w1’’. . . and w2,w2’,w2’’. . . which are disjointly and 
exhaustively valid. As such, the operation constructing them makes a non-empty null set, {0}=W0. Their 
summation by subscript alone are conjointly true. So w1w2 but if w1 is valid, so is w1’.  
 
This does not violate workspace conditions following Chomsky. (1995:243, 2017, et. al)3 Workspace 
construction is nested so that the scope of the articulatory-operation is well-defined and determined by 
what state it has reached as per the successor-function.i So w=[a,b] such that w=0 or null, and 
w’=[{a,b}]=[{a,b},[w]]=[{a,b},[0]] such that w’=1 for null=0=everything, 1={0}, 2={0,{0}}={0,1}, etc. 
Thus, workspace construction follows the construction of ordinals.  
 
By illustrating the operation indicating the subject’s articulation of identity brings with it the context in 
which that identity is appropriate as the expression of that context’s subject. We will call this a reference 
frame. Frames index the context of the assertion of identity as a function of nominal application. As an 
individual exists in finite time, this limit is placed on the state that subject acquires from the infinitely 
many possible, making the capacity recursive. The states attained by a subject over the course of its form 
of life are unique to that individual due to the context in which it participates and/or is introduced. 
Workspaces represent the reference frames in which the objects available to articulation are restricted. 
Restriction is required, otherwise the operation would produce contradictions or its scope would remain 
null because whatever is produced would have no one context in which it may be asserted. The output 
constructed, here the identity, would apply to every context without any hope of determining any one 
individual. Producing no one thing in particular, or one thing applicable everywhere thus any where, 
makes reference impossible. The use of a name is only applicable in so far as we know where that name 
does not apply, providing a non-normative explanation with the least assumptions or stipulations in order 
to explain what is retroactively considered a normative concept of reference. Structure provides what is 
needed for semantic interpretations (Chomsky, 1995) for if we were to rely on stipulation, we would need 
to provide justification for those stipulations which would not have a method of verifying or justifying 
themselves. This process avoids those shortcomings.  
 
As the scope of functions are limited, a requirement for producing useful articulations indexing the 
contexts in which those subject’s participate while maintaining subject-continuity, the r-function can be 
shown to evolve based on past operations. The subject’s “stock” of functions ready for application 
expands with each “function” it determines by way of the context it produces. We can account for both 
the formation of w as well as how w and w-successors are the conditions for alternative w’s. As w is 
                                                      
3 Follows internal merge, here articulation from an endowment, rules: 
 
 f(a,b)→[{a,b}=c] which implies that, [ fa,fb,{a,b}=c]=[0,0,{a,b}=c]=[0,c] 
 
where {0} represents the zeroed functions of c's endowment and the members of the workspace entailed by the method of constructing that space. 
The workspace for the subject whose operation expresses c, if fa= “a” as the zero of the function constructing the context in which a was a 
member, then looks more like: [“a”,“b”,c] where c={a,b}, f(c)=[c], and fc(0)=“c” for that label has yet to be applied to/in any one way/object; 
thus constructing the set of objects considered/labeled “c”. Chomsky takes care to emphasize that no thing is lost after this initial merge. Of 
course, 0 added to some object does not change that object; just as well that object is such because constructed from a function whose initial state 
is zero. Internal merge, by definition, occurs when b<a, where c takes up fa; or a<b, where c takes up fb. If the operation under c takes up fb, this 
represents an extension of b as c; if that subject takes up fa, no extension of c but a deepening of its endowment as the stock of prior participation-
-active or emerging from--regarding context construction thus being introduced to and possibly acquiring those functions: fa={"a"} 
and  fb={a,{a,b}} the function of whose union constitutes what is considered "c"={fc}, the set of zeroed functions previously acquired by c, an 
effective representation of the subject c’s endowment prior to articulating any one thing that is “c”—see discussion on prefunctions.  
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constructed by r(n), the use of n implies w because it is the material from which one constructs an initial 
w—e.g. the move from n=0 to {n}. The result, r indexes n to w by use in relief to all options available 
within the union of prior workspaces.  
 
A demonstration of this can be shown by intuitionist logics. (Gödel, 1958; Heyting, 1930; proof by 
Kripke, 1965) By induction, if we suppose a, then by its assertion we get the context {a}. From this, the 
construct of this context is understood in relief of others which are not yet barred from doing the same. So 
within that set of others in which {a} is now a member, {{a}}={a,{a,b}} which we know from Gödel 
orders a partition of null, <a,b>, where a is less than b. This can be interpreted as a being function of b for 
<a,b>=<a<b>>. For example, if 3,2,1 is well ordered, then any partition of it is in that order. So, if 
<3,2,1>, then <3<2,1>>. The domain of b is a. For, a is both part of and apart from b as determined by an 
ordered-relation in respect to, so pairing a with b. We showed the construction of a workspace and an 
accessibility relation from structure alone. As well as the emergence of the r-function described above. 
With r(n) being recursive, we can illustrate the construct of any context as well as how they interact with 
each other.  
 
Suppose from prior articulations we produce c. We have a function built using the conditional, if/then 
symbolized by ‘→’ and ‘’ as conjunction,  such that,  
 
f: a→b 
 
If this operation is transitive, we map c onto this operation,  
 
c(f): c(a)→c(b) 
 
which is to say, c→(a→b). From this we can say if there is a function mapping b to a, then if f(a,b) then 
f(a)→f(b) for our notion of if a,b implies that a is included in b, the move from no one thing to any one 
thing as a morphism of that domain. In this project, we call this an articulation from that domain: realities 
as various context qua models arranged from the objects of the actual world; the set of all objects in the 
actual world being the set of no one thing, thus null for any one reality.4 Then if c→a and c→b, then if a 
and b, infer c. We obtain modus ponens for if c given a and b, then if c then if a and b then c. We also see 
how c emerges from a,b which is both a part of c and apart from c as its conditions. Thus, the endowment 
that we speak of is a repertoire of f and f-successors which are not present but represented by the 
emergence of c within the state of affairs composed. The context of “c” is the well-defined function, the 
operation over a,b, determining the domain, the context of its use, as b to a. The function f becomes a map 
of the conditions a,b and what is articulated from those conditions is continuous just so long as f(b) is 
included in c. We will see this in regards to our discussion of internal merge and rearticulation below.  
                                                      
4 Let A be the actual, i.e. no one object in the actual world, and let F be a particular arrangement of the objects whose relation express the 
function of a model qua context in that world. F is included or equal to H. F follows these properties:  
 
1. F is valid 
2. If x,y are included in F, then the conjunction of x,y included in F, 
3. If x is in F, y in A, and xy, then y is in F, expressing that null is both a part of remains apart from whatever is articulated as what is 
articulated is constructed and expressed by an operation over null.  
 
Therefore, given any subset S of A, there is a smallest contextual reality containing S. We say the context is articulated—for Heyting, 
generated—by operations in A by S. If S is in null, F={1}. Otherwise, F is equal to the set x in A such that there exist  y in S with yx. If A 
follows our Heyting quotient and equivalence rules, and F is a context on A, we determine a function ~ on A as follows: we 
write x ∼ y whenever x→y and y→x both belong to F. Then ∼ is an equivalence relation such that an operation in null is equivalent to the 
function of an articulated identity modeled in the context constructed. Thus, we state that a model is such that F/~, whose elements are represent 
[f]. Functions utilized in the reality labeled by the functional content of F, [F]—as [f0,f1,f2,…]=[f0,[f1,f2,…]]=[F,[f1,f2,…]] and F=f0 is the label 
whose application is a function of all objects in F—are determined by an equivalence relation on operations in null conceived by set-theoretical 
construction. So, from f→e in null we get if [F→E] such that A(F,E), where F,E are related by the function determined by operations in A. We 
will go into this in more detail below.  
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According to intuitionist logics, a→b is ba, for a→b=ab. We have shown above how the concept  can 
be defined by set-theoretical construction. So, if we have values 0, ½, and 1, then we have a→b so long as 
a0, otherwise b is any one thing. If ba, then the set of everything is no one thing for b, just so long as a. If 
a=0, then a must be the set of everything for no one thing as yet has been determined. All subsequent 
articulations follow from null, the set of no one thing framed by b. Thus c→(a→b) also shows c(ab), 
inferring an operation over a,b producing c, all couples, possible arrangements, of features of a,b 
articulate the function that is the content of c. Boolean conjunction expresses multiplication. So, if not-
(ab) then not-c because there is no a nor b. Therefore, c(ab), c a subset of ba, whose extension is up to 
where c just is ba. So, there is a domain of c, even if null, that is ba given the articulation of c. In other 
words, there is a c within the frame constituted by (ab) the function of which, f(a,b), is the zero of c, 
f(f(a,b))=f(c,0). This is the functional content of the context of c’s assertion, {f(c)}, before any one 
application of “c” producing the entities considered c.  
 
How does this apply to articulation theory? Say that a=<w,n,r>. From our method of construction, n, then 
{n}, then {n,{r,n}}. We do the same for b. The context of a’s assertion, in accordance with Gödel, would 
be a=<w<n,r>>, where w is expressed by a function of some name whose operation indicates the means 
of w’s construction. The workspace w, then is determined as the group (a,b), so (w(a,b)). An operation on 
that group would entail,  
 
R(a,b,w)= (ab)→w’=[c={a,b},a,b].  
 
Let’s say that c enters into an operation with a. The constituents of a do not enter into the operation, only 
what is represented on the workspace {a,b}, the union of “a”,”b”. Their names alone make the zero of the 
function “c”, positing null as both the conditions from which c emerges and part of c. So the operation is 
({a}c), c and the name of a, which is not c[a| <w,n,r>]. Otherwise, c would change its internal structure 
making cc, canceling itself out.  
 
As {a}=n, for “a”={f(a)}, the object that enters into the articulatory process, the identity of a, is separate 
from the operation constructing a; its subjectivity exhibited by f cannot be the features of [a], but are 
present in the conditions allowing us to discern that workspace.5 As name, f(a), being the content of the 
                                                      
5 As null is the only set that contains itself, the content of an object in itself, as no other thing, is the function of its expression. The zero of a 
function is no one thing, thus a member of the set which only contains itself as a member. The set of all functions, thus no one function, uses a 
function determined from null to label any thing to construct the context it inhabits. The subject itself, the “floor” of that context from which its 
operation is expressed, is null for it is no one thing to anyone in context. The identity itself, the “ceiling,” is the determination of the function of 
that operation, the least object greater than all that is in that context it constructs. E.g. <x0,x1,x2>=<x0,<x1,x2,. . . >>where x0=fx=X for embedded 
in the assertion of X is its function of application. Without arguments, X is a label whose application is appropriately determined such that 
<X<x1,x2,. . .>>As such, it is a label applicable in that context. Our notation, “a”={fa}, represents the operation expressing a’s subjectivity. The 
function of “a” emerges from an operation within null, yielding valid identifications of that subject dependent upon context of assertion. 
Embedded in that function is the limit of the extension of various articulations of “a” which need not be predetermined. In lieu of using  …, for 
the function of identity we will use […],  as an equivalence class modeling underlying operations. Brackets note the interval over the arc of the 
form of life constructed by the operation of the subject whose function is that subjects identity in that interval, i.e. context. For the subject-
operation from null, the symbols  … are replaced by {...} to suggest set-theoretical construction. In this way, we define equivalence classes 
whereby operations over elements of null represent a function over classes by virtue of Heyting algebra rules. So, a=a=a. By definition, if x 
varies over contexts of assertion such that 0x1, for n<1, if x<n floor(n)=x, and for n<x ceiling(n)=x. So, {f(a)}, the set of all to which “a” 
applies, displays subjectivity (x) regardless of identity (n), for the subject-operation is the function f(a,0) and the range of identities of a is such 
that f(a,x) where ax and x is the context in which “a” is asserted, indicating the same subject expressed by f. It follows, that null is both a part of 
and apart from every assertion whereby contexts are constructed, and therefore inhabited, by some subject-operation regardless of identity 
stipulation. Subject capacity outstrips identity stipulations for beyond the ceiling, there is some operation whose expressions cannot be identified. 
We know this because the fractional-part of this function states that, unless subject and identity are equal, null, then there is always portions of 
the contextual-floor, that is not accounted for by the ceiling-stipulation within the set whose internal operations express subjectivity. We affirm 
that there is an f at zero for all entities. f(x0) is the subject within context before identity and as such is included in the set of x. X is the label 
applied to set of all that is x; all that is in excess is not-x, thus X represents a ceiling to the category of what is considered x. X= f(x0), 
representing the subject that has acquired that function who has yet to apply it to, utilize it to express, any one thing, thus the subject is no one 
thing in and of itself. As such, that function, in itself, is equivalent to the label applied to any one thing, utilized to denote no one x but every 
x. Reference cannot be uniquely determined save by reference frame, otherwise leading to contradictions embedded in the act of identification. 
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assertion of that name means that f produces all possible subsets constructed in that initial context implied 
by that names assertion: {a}, {a,{a}}, etc.  For a’s features, the content of its assertion is the function 
relating those aspects of a, are not represented in the workspace to which c has access. [a] is indicated by 
the operation constructing the set representing it in total from elements outside the scope of c. In this way, 
subject continuity can be shown so that a is non-empty. Again, blackness is not vacuous as the Afro-
pessimist claims. Subjects can only be labeled, identified, as such. Negation presupposes the existence of 
the entity it negates. An identifier, “empty,” is not a necessary constituent of a for a is only such by way 
of its mode of expression, the operation indicating its subjectivity, expressing its form of life. The identity 
is merely a label applied over or within context. Subjectivity cannot be empty for that would negate 
everything that animates that label. The subject must not be empty in order to make its categorization as 
“nothing” possible at all.  
 
The function constructing “{a}” is an operation of a, making the content of {} the function of a. The 
identity “a” does not equal a. If “{a}” is such that [a] is a member, then [a] is a member of {a} by some 
property. That property is not-[a], thus [a] is not a member of itself but a member of the set denoted by 
that property. That set is only such by way of its method of construction from all [a], otherwise a would 
not be a member of itself for it would be identical to that property, making the absurd statement that a is 
“a” if and only if “a” is not a.  
 
Setting up the workspace example in this way, the concept of reference is taken care of as a superficial 
descriptor is applied after some constructive operation. If reference was merely the exchange of terms or 
the interchangeability of an operation for the term it produces, reference loses the relationship we wished 
to precisify in the first place. A chain is created by the function illustrated above, providing the correct 
semantic interpretations required for a reference frame by virtue of the syntactic structure of the contexts 
constructed. In this way, f(c) is seen as embedded in the workspace, the endowment expressed by an 
operation over its antecedents. As such, c is an extension as well as a deepening of that subject, only now 
identified as “c”. The embeddedness of c within the conditions from which it emerges—see the 
construction of ordinals—entails that the means to rearticulate states of affairs are embedded in each 
context by virtue of that context’s having been constructed in the first place. Any stipulation of 
universality sows inconsistencies in the system held constant over contexts for, inevitably, there will be a 
context in which c and not-c are the case by virtue of making that name interchangeable with a context in 
which it is not applicable because it as its function was not the means of its construction.  
 
Suppose that “c” becomes a function whose domain is a,b and produces a successor c’. We translate a 
‘→’ as ‘’, conjunction by multiplication, ‘’, and assign values to expressions that range between 0 and 
1.  
                                                      
However, functions can be uniquely determined in a way that they become available for application within the appropriate situation because 
previously used to construct the context that situation cites. The object of thought f is the function whose application populates expresses the x in 
the category set by X 
 
We can assume, then, that f(f(x0), f(y0))=f(0) is same subject, {fx,fy}, the set of functions acquired and yet to be applied. This endowment 
identified in different ways. The “knowledge” of self, the zero of various functions, has the capacity to assert alternate identities so that x1 is not 
equal to y1. This shows that null is both less than, included, as well as greater than, external, to every identity constructed or identification made. 
E.g. {x}=x-x, then x=f(x)=“x”. From this it follows that there is always a remainder of x after “x” is calculated, implying another identity 
under which x operates inaccessible to f(x). The contextual-construct “me”=“Victor,” is me based on prior subject-representations of “me.” It 
follows that I am in excess of both those prior representations as the “I” constructing/using them as well as the context constructed/identified as 
me—unless this is my first cognizant moment, implying the existence of an initial state whose content is a prefunction of which its prompted 
operation is the subject structuring the initial data set, perceived as no one thing externally, but whose function, after application, is how that 
subject is identified by others. The function of that identity is the limit of my participation in that context. This does not violate the fact that the 
context’s limits is the representation of “me” and the function of that identity “Victor” such that I, myself, both participate in and yet remain apart 
from that context by virtue of other identities. We are licensed to say {fa} because the identity of ceiling and floor is a relation that supports the 
assertion of an identity as the context that subject participates; even though it, itself, cannot be represented in that context because its operation 
constructs that context.  
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a→a = a  a 
 
We define a function of a,  
 
fa: f(0)→a 
 
for,  
 
0→a=0  a  
 
fa=f(a,0)=A which is the determinate, the zero, of the label for what we come to call as a function of that 
label’s application, “a.” If a is our constant, fa(0), then, any thing follows from no one thing. We proceed 
with a statement of b,  
 
a→b = a  b 
 
making for ba such that we have a frame of a in which we can discern the articulation of various entities.   
 
In our Heyting scheme, “if a then b” is equivalent to a less than or equal to b, which is to say b given a, 
(b/a). If a is greater than 0, conditionalizing over null, the set of all possible, obtains some partition of null 
as our reference frame determined as the domain ba for subsequent operations. If a=0, and with the 
assumption that any thing follows from null, (b/a)=1/0, which leaves the conditional non-determinate. 1/0, 
however, is the representation for infinity, proving the point that a non-empty null, meaning null for a 
singular context, for no one thing in any particular context, is the ground from which anything may be 
articulated. An operation over null, then, is infinitely recursive, therefore generative. As such, if a is 
greater than 0 or just 0, the disjoint union of (a,not-a), makes an operation over that space a modal 
operator, possibly-a. This operation is the mode that “a” appears in the world, articulated in the reference 
frame of b. The domain of null available for subsequent articulations outside of the domain of a, in what 
is not-a, is (1-a), for which we will see the usefulness below. If c results from some operation in ba, 
namely (ab), then c’ is possible in the partition (1-a), for, if a then b is a less than or equal to b, then, c 
and a is less than or equal to b, for b is set as the domain in which c is obtainable. It pays to remember 
that according to Heyting definitions, if 1 less than or equal to 0 then a entails that a, for null remains in 
excess of the entity articulated within the domain stipulated. For if a then b entails ba, and c and a is less 
than or equal to b, then c is less than or equal to a. Thus, a is both part of and apart from the extension of 
c. The remainder indicates the existence of alternative contexts outside the domain currently determined, 
possible within and from null.  
 
For now, we state that a=b, so if 1 then 1, as the domain of our world and within which possible realities 
as contexts are articulated. “If a then b” creates the frame in which all possible worlds can be articulated, 
this framework states the conditions one moves from no one thing to a context determined as no one 
thing. Thus c,d, and others can be articulated in that frame, indicative of their own frames—see ordinal 
logics, c-successors within b—and are valid because able to be substantiated as a b-successor. Each 
operation within ba conducts a pairwise grouping with what is articulated basis in b: [c,b’], [c or d,b’’], 
etc.; for, for all articulated in ba is valid because b is valid, 0 to {0}, 0 to 1. As such, there is always a part 
of null that lies outside the scope of the contexts articulated.  
 
We model c’s articulation,  
 
(ab) →c=(ab)c 
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What if c enters into an operation with its antecedent a creating c’. We say that c takes up a’s function, 
f(a)=0, the capacity to articulate “a” appropriate to context, as part of its endowment. As c was articulated 
from those prior conditions; the zero of f(a) in c is plausible. It does not take up a in and of itself. So,  
 
(ca)→b= (ca) b = c  a  b 
 
which makes sense, for  
 
c→c = c  c 
(ca) c 
 
then if (ca), then (ca) c, a deepening of c’s endowment.  
 
As such, if c results from a b c then c c. Otherwise, if 10 a where not-a=a 0, makes (anot-a)=0. If 
(ca) or (cb)  c then c  a b c. If c is greater than a,b, all that is in excess of that operation is f(c) 
determined by the operation (ab). From the less than or equal perspective, what is categorized as "c" in 
a category in the frame b to the a is what is generated within that frame by that operation. It goes to say a 
universal description of c captures no one thing about c, for as of yet, that function has yet to be taken up 
by any operation. Just the same, "c" is only such by its mode of expression, its application to the outputs 
of the operation that articulated it in the frame b to a. "f(c)" is the name of the property of having been 
produced by the operation b to a, and as such, what is “c” and yet greater than b to a is merely the label of 
the category "c" which is not a part of b to a itself but by the entities produced by that prior operation 
that are labeled such. The label cannot stand on its own. This way we can infer functions producing the 
constituents of states by their operation. Thus the null set is not void but contains functions (partitioned 
endowments) as the content of every construct by a subject from that set of no one thing. So, 
“c”=0={f(c)}. For c cannot be greater than itself but that valid proposition, cc, states what is in excess of 
the entities under that label and nevertheless exhibit c-ness by the operation utilizing that label, 
therefore inferring a function, a subject, constructing what we consider c in the first place. 
 
The statement, if “c” then c, is computable, not just an affirmation of the consequent.6 We handle this 
through diagonalization. Diagonalization is ultimately about self-reference, so we state if (ab) then c, 
then if c, then if (ab), then c. Firstly, ab can be represented for expository purposes as, f(a,b). “c” is the 
representation of the function of c. C, a formula whose functional content is “c”. We know this formula to 
be “c”=f(a,b)=f(c,0)=C for, if (ab) then c, the zero, determinate, of f(c) represents a label for c before 
application. 
 
By Gödel’s computability theorem for diagonalization, we know that C=(“c”c), the pairing of every 
symbol “c” with f(a,b), the existence of at least one c for an n-ary member of the pairwise union of all a,b. 
In this way, n=“c”, the diagonal of n implying “c” and c. This is an affirmation of the conditions and the 
possibility for the emergence of c because “c” is constructible, computable. This is not to say that “c” is 
necessary to what it labels. 
  
Let f(“c”,n) be the case where n picks out one pairwise constituent of (ab). Assume C represents the 
diagonal whose functional content is diag, D the formulaic determinate of C. Let F be the formula whose 
functional content is the operation that implies y such that F=(f(x,y), C(y)). Assume D’s equivalence to 
the formula, x such that x=(“F”,F) representing the diagonal of F. Let “c”,“n” be the representations of 
F,D respectively. By definition, diag(“F”)=“D”, thus C(c,n) is valid. Furthermore, D is equivalent to the 
                                                      
6 A short proof follows this remark but for a fuller exposition see Gödel’s 1931 proofs.  
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existence of x such that x=c and there is y such that (f(x,y),C(y)); which is equivalent to there being a y 
such that (f(c,y),C(y)). Because of the function of C and the validity of C(c,n), this formula is equivalent 
to (f(c,n),C(n)), which is equivalent to C(n). As, F is equivalent to C(“D”), then D iff and only if C(“D”), 
the function of c is constructible, thereby determinable within the context it constructs.  
 
In this way, one can utilize the function whose operation is the act of applying "c" without its obtaining 
any one object. That assertion was made in excess of the appropriate domain because it was not done in 
the context determined as such due to its being constructed by the operation with which c was expressed. 
Although we do not pursue a descriptivist theory of names, we still obtain the benefit of Russel's theory of 
definite descriptions.  For the name "c" is not c in and of itself; nevertheless "c" is c for us when we apply 
it to those objects in the contexts for which the concept c is applicable. With the assertion of "c" implying 
a context in which it was asserted, that context can be empty save for its functional content, the assertion 
of that name. 
 
This makes sense as the functions of a,b construct c as the pair-wise aggregate of “function(name-
function,context)=assertion”: f(a)=0, f(a,1)=a, f(a,2)=a’ etc. and f(b)=0, f(b,1)=b, etc. such that the 
function in itself expressing all that is a is 0 for context construction is ordinally based on the set-
theoretical construction of numbers—sets and set of sets as determinate of functions and their domains. 
So, f(0)=a, b, c, etc. However, by some operation, f(c)= f(“a”,“b”). This should not be controversial as 
(“a”,“b”)=( fb(0), fa(0))=0 such that f(c)=f(c,f(fa,fb))=f(0,f(0)) in the domain ba. In this way, “c”, articulated 
in ba, entails that  f(c)=f(c,0) by functional-composition.7 The assertion of that name, for which the context 
implied was constructed by the use of other nominal-functions makes it such that “c”=f(c,f(0)) following 
primitive recursive principles. Utilizing the set-theoretical construction of functions: a second-order 
articulation from that null base returns the constant of the domain previously constructed as f(c) in 
accordance with functional composition, here the evolution of the functions within an endowment 
constructed from prior articulations, showing that it is possible to pass a subset of the arguments of one 
function to another function; and, the role of functional projection, here the assertion of identity as the 
construction of, because it implies, the context in which that identity is asserted. So, if f(a)=0, then by set-
theoretical construction c has access to a at f(0)=“a”. The “features” of the endowment of c, the domain 
over which f(c) runs, includes (fa, fb,) as zeroes, which is just how “c” appears as the continuation of the 
contexts previously constructed and known as “a” or “b”. So, f(c,1)=c includes either the zeroed function 
of a or b.  
 
In articulation terms, (ab)→c=[not-(ab) or c] because (ab) c. Effectively, if c→a, c→b, and if we 
have c, for c given (ab), then (ab)→c which represents our rule of inference: c((ab)c)=c(ab)c. 
We understand “given” for we “know,” have acquired, the zero of the function whose application actively 
                                                      
7 Remember, for any set “a”, we understand that a=0, and “a” is constructed a(0,x1,x2,x3,...)=f(x1,x2,x3,...) such that we construct the members of 
“a” off successors from f(a)=0 on. This can be assumed for any set of objects considered a within that reference frame. It follows at a,b,c,… all 
have an f at their zero for they are only such by the means of constructing the set characterized as such. Therefore, if a(0,x1,x2,x3,...)=f(x1,x2,x3,...) 
and so for b, where f(a,0)=a and f(b,0)=b then if f(“a,b”,0)=c, then (f(c), x1,x2,x3,...)=f(“a,b”,f(“a,b”,x1,x2,x3. . .)) so that f(c,0)=c. Identity 
projection wise, f(f(a,b),0)=f(f(a,0),f(b,0))=f(c). We understand that “c” because we know the conditions in which c emerged as the functions of 
those conditions. Having acquired that knowledge, zero of those functions, when applied articulates c. And so, we see how functions are objects 
of thought, which can be determined and therefore available to construct our world but are not physical “things” in that world but nevertheless 
must be in order for the world to be anything for us at all. Once constructed, the citation of these functions become available for future 
applications at the zero for a successor-context’s construction. Concepts like “memory,” spirit, one’s endowment, their content is functional, not a 
stockpile; hence why unique objects of the mind, functions, are only evoked in unique contexts because they were, thereby that individual was, 
previously involved in the construction the succession of contexts leading to the one we currently occupy. As such, subjects, and the realities they 
construct, are, in themselves, incomplete a la the quantum physicist Niels Bohr; cannot simultaneously measure their location and speed a la 
Heisenberg. The subject is a vector. From an epistemological view, all that can be known is its projection, however, the output of a recursive 
function, that projection cannot stand on its own and is only supported by the operation immanent to it, its subjectivity. Their content, as such, is a 
collection of determinant functions, recursively constructing their mode of being. The subject occupies the null position at theirs, or when 
introduced to the line of successors of another’s, construct of the web of relations that is their world, creating outward from there and bringing 
with them the objects they utilized beforehand. Use, the operation, of functions as content of assertion can be uniquely determined and proven 
based on context and their successors of assertion based on ordinals; whereas reference relies on stipulations without means of justification on 
their own becoming either more ambiguous with successive application or inconsistent with previous use.  
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constructs the context in which c emerges. Thus, c given a,b is not identical to a,b given c, however, given 
what is considered c is only by the function constructing the context of its assertion, then there is a 
function of a,b.  
 
With ab and (ab)c, then if we have (ab), we obtain c. The “c” articulated becomes a function of the 
set {a, b}, the pair-wise aggregate of the features whose relation expressed a,b, As such, we obtain 
c(ab)=“c”. It remains to be shown how this property of the operation over a,b expresses the function of 
“c” whose domain is c(ab), stating that (ab) is the horizon of possibility for c and a function of a. The 
semantics of this articulatory process covers that (ab) is necessary in the possible world c, which is only 
the case when (ab) is possible. Thus, (ab) becomes a member of null, both part of c, for it is the axiom 
from which c was constructed, and apart from c, as the features of a or b inclusive are members of the set 
of no one thing—see null as basis for the axiom of foundation (Zermelo-Fraenkel) and von Neumann-
Bernays-Gödel’s notion of ordinals based off Peano’s axioms of arithmetic. ii  
 
A logic set up in this way formalizes a bounded lattice as the workspace One actively constructed by a 
mechanism mapping the operation of a subject. Within this space, conjunction, (ab), are the points at 
which lines meet, the lines between those points represent conditionalization within that space, 
constructing the notion of membership to a category expressed by the meeting of lines of thought. The 
system of categorization implied by the internal structure of the space indicates the reference frame 
shown by the exponent of a particular individual under some name. So, if a→b, then the accessibility 
parameter to the domain of that workspace is ba, displaying the conditions in which c can emerge.  
 
From this we show how the contexts in which entities emerge are related constructing that state of affairs. 
Take f(x0)=X, where X is a nominal tag for any one x, for <x0,x1,x2,…>=<x0<x1,x2,. . .>> in such a way 
that, <X<x1,x2,. . .>>. From this we say that each x is X related to itself, X(x,x), in every iteration of the 
appropriate context of assertion. X is the reference frame qua context in which the assertion of x as a 
function of its application within that context obtains. Thus, each assertion of an x is paired, comes with, 
x0=fx as the function of appropriate use of that name, just so long as it is within the domain of x-
successors characterized under the context of X and its successors.8 “X” as a label only applies to objects 
xn, produced by some operation whose function expresses X-ness by the function of applying X, 
otherwise the class of objects x is empty for X applies to no one thing. Even if considered purely a 
predicate, X, on its own, is revealed as only having a function as content; relating, as arguments, an entity 
and the relation that entity obtains within the context constructed by the assertion of that label. If we 
consider the function f defined over sets of entities in x,y such that,  
 
f(x,y):(AB)→C 
 
the features of those sets as variables x in A and y in B. If we hold that a is fixed in A, the articulatory 
function becomes,  
 
f(a,y):B→C 
 
which makes that function some feature of C such that f(a,y) is an element of CB now available in the 
domain accessible to the repertoire over which the process of articulation runs. If we let a vary, this gives 
us a map of that domain such that,  
 
f:A→CB 
 
                                                      
8 For x0=X, we show xn+1=X’ such that nominal assertion f(x,n)=X
n such that all Xn are included in X securing citational consistency.  
 15 
in which the concept of subject continuity is maintained. In fact, this continuity is unique such that if 
f:A→CB is the parameter determining the access the articulation-function has within the domain A,B then 
there is a function fa(y):B→C that indicates the operation expressing the subject as a function of 
articulation: 
 
f(a,b)=(ab)→c 
 
This function exemplifies the property of articulation. In this way f(AB,C) is equivalent to (A,CB). We, 
then, model the formation of states of affairs A,B,C, as a function of the relation of individual contexts 
x,y,z.  
 
A diagram of this process can be inferred from the following principles. From if a, then b, we derive a, or 
not-a, or b as nodes or points within the lattice such that b is connected to a and not-a and where a and 
not-a are not connected. When a and b are connected, we get (a and b) connected to c; where 
disconnected we obtain not-(a and b), which is to say not-a or not-b, connected to c. In this case, c 
connected to b is c to the power of b. This entails that c is such up until not-b, for a is less than b, c is less 
than a and b, and where there is no b, there cannot be c. Each connection, then, represents a conditional. 
The direction of conditionalization indicates the consequent from antecedent conditions. We can think of 
a lattice as a sort of quilt, its patterns are the repertoire that a subject cites and utilizes as a function 
expressive of itself in whatever environment it participates as an extension of prior articulations.  
 
In sum, there is a function such that we move from the set of no one thing, “a,” to some thing, “b.” That 
process sets up the frame in which c emerges. As “c” becomes that frame, for c is less than or equal to c, 
“c” may determine a constituent within that frame for which that name is not the constituent itself but 
only the representation that c constructs of either a or b. For if c, then if a,b, then c means that the 
emergence of c indicates a function whose operation over a,b are the condition of c—see Appiah on 
conditionals and functionalism.  
 
Ambiguities in the concept of a workspace—as noted by Chomsky, (2017; 2019) et. al—can be accounted 
for in articulation theory. Determinations erroneously based on identity rather than subject capacity 
produce the means of their dissolution. We have accepted the limitations of a finite capacity being 
required for the production of infinite uses. This ambiguity we will call the identity paradox. Labels on 
their own have no scope save for their application, but what licenses that application is the frame of 
reference in which the features which animate the function of that label are negated in order to trade that 
body of features for sake of membership within category constructed within that frame. Identity, as far as 
we can conceptually determine its function, is expressed by input and output where that relation holds 
necessarily within context. If (ca)=(cb)=“c” for c becomes the identity of (ab) when considered a pair-
wise grouping of the functions as features of its endowment, inherited from a,b. The identity determined 
by the function “c”=c(ab) expresses the relation between a, b that denotes “c” if and only if c(ab), for 
if we lose either a or b we would no longer have c at all. “c,” then, is the function c in the context ba and is 
only expressed by those features whose relation within that domain projects that property. The assertion 
of “c” brings a,b with it. However, (ab) are not represented in the assertion for (ab)→c=[not-(ab) or 
c]. Identity is only decidable relative to the workspace, the partition of null entering into the computation. 
Individually, a label can point to any one feature of an individual, however, through the set-theoretical 
construction of this operation, the function of that label is structurally, contextually, determined.  
 
III.  
 
To recap, endowments are constituted by functions. The functions are the well-determined objects of 
mechanism for creating thought as they are the only discernible content of an assertion, the application of 
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these functions expressive of subjectivity without reliance on categorical identity for application 
constructs the contexts in which systems of categorization possibly obtain. We have framed cultural 
endowments in this way to show that subjectivity is conceived by the relation between contexts in which 
an identity assertion obtains, the function of its construction considered the fabric upon which the 
operations of subjectivity can be considered vectors having magnitude and direction. We further develop 
this notion via constructive analysis under the concept of presets—see Bishop and Bridges, 1985—the 
possible contexts in which identities are asserted. The function of identity application constructs the 
contexts in which those identities are appropriate. The concept of endowments under the notion of its 
objects being prefunctions. The latter perceived functional content of the assertion made exhibiting the 
“S”-ness of the subjectivity working therein must be in excess of the parameters of that context by virtue 
of the use of an identity appropriate to that context. (nLab, 2019) As identity assertion implies/refers to 
the context of its assertion, the possibility of a context to be constructed (preset) implies there is a 
function present but not yet represented (prefunction) because no context, as of yet, has been constructed. 
The operation (subjectivity) utilizing these functions (endowment) as the content of its assertion 
(contexts), is provable before assertion. In this way, functions become the objects, the so called 
“features,” of subjectivity as the mechanism to create thought, hence the subject, is readily ascertained by 
modes of expression. Operations over these functions create unique, well-ordered, sequences of 
application, e.g. methods of computation or algorithms, as unique modes of expression. Thus, as the 
means of expression, these functions represent a repertoire of signifying practices we have called the 
endowment of the subjectivity expressed, its lexicon. Although of the same endowment, the same subject 
can express identities appropriate to context but not necessarily caused by context, even if using only 
what is available within context. Therefore, subjectivity is a creative capacity. We chose this route 
because functions can be well defined while identity, name to subject, remains ambiguous. A single 
subject can have multiple identities; a single identity can be utilized by multiple subjects. Subjectivity as a 
vector, is an operation expressed by its movement in the world(s) it inhabits because constructs those 
worlds.  
 
Formulating subjectivity as such, subjects can be analyzed in accordance with their movement. We do not 
have to consider an interval over the arc that is their form of life as definitive of subjectivity in total. It is 
this movement that expresses the subject relative to the stock of identity formations, understood by their 
function, previously constructed and made available within particular parameters. Subjects are individual 
but not mutually exclusive from each other. The operation constructing contexts implies participation in 
that context. Although intuitionist logics are undecidable for first-order descriptions, we can model the 
formation of conditions in which subjects emerge by virtue of identity constructs in a way sufficient to 
our project. This does not necessitate the stipulation of one or another thing obtaining regardless of 
context, only the formation of those conditions in which these objects emerge and in which identity 
becomes decidable is required for a theory of the articulation of subjectivity. Subjects have been posited 
as vectors in order to capture their movement without having to trade a determined interval, whose 
coordinates are interchangeable with that subject, at the expense of the internal operation articulating it.   
 
With cultural endowments as the domain over which the operations of subjectivity runs, the distribution 
of an intensional constructive capacity. Regarding racial stipulations, we are talking about the extension 
of a system of categorization concomitant with the ontological commitments the utilization of that system 
entails is troubled. Without the former, the latter is empty. I will continue with a discussion of the former 
for the remainder of this project.  
 
So, “if a then b” is the articulation from no one thing to a complete description of everything—a 
description not being the entity itself but a property which that entity, by any one of its features, indicates 
some category as function of that property; gaining them access to another category indicated by having 
another property—that description can be of anything. The validity of the function of conditions states 
that it is not the case that a true antecedent and a false consequent obtains, all that is, is b while the zero of 
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the function a becomes the name of that domain. If an identity is universally applicable, it is useless. We 
conclude that identity does not refer to some extra-mental trait but to its context of application. Each 
articulation procedure creates a context within those condition. If a, then there is some context A in which 
a function over the entity a is applicable. We move from no none context, thus every context unified at 0, 
and which at present is A0=0, to A=A1, A1’=A2. . .An. A0 means that no one and therefore any one feature 
is applicable. No context, as of yet, has been articulated. The successor A’ is constructed by taking the 
universal description of its predecessor, a context-reflexive name unprovable in that context for defined 
by it, as an axiom for the construction of that successor-context in which that predecessor can be 
substantiated. Thus, null unifies these properties which are disjointly exhaustive, (A0,B0, . . .). The 
intersection of a certain n-ary context is where a function of articulation has determined the partition of 
null in which certain individuals may or may not emerge.  
 
To say x has the property of being a member of itself is to say of x that x has that property. However, to 
say this is to say that x has as one of its members something that is not-x and, therefore, x is such because 
it has the property that is not-x. As a member of itself, x is just in case there is that property defined by 
not-x, leading to a contradiction. In order for x to be the case is so just in case x is not-x, for x can only be 
such by that external property. The function of that property we have shown above leads to the identity 
paradox, concluding that one is x, because of x, as x is only had or understood by its method of 
construction. As such, it is related to itself by that property, a statement about x which is the context of 
x’s assertion, A(x). A statement about that context cannot be proven on its own, so is added to it making 
f(a0)=A=“a”, the context (A) in which the name (a) applies f(a) which populates the objects appropriate to 
each successive context of application. So, A0(a,x)=x, A’=A1(x), and so on such that A(a,x)=f(f(a),x). 
Thus, we model successive applications of that name. Each iteration a more complete statement of x than 
the last. Based on these operations, we can suggest that blackness’ cultural endowment is embedded in 
each context of its assertion. Subject-continuity as a vector, lends itself to the ordinal construction of 
contexts. Each successor-context is valid based on a citation of the former. As such, blackness is no one 
thing but a movement. Blackness is blackness and not interchangeable with another thing. 
 
So, the nominal-context A is the set whose only content is{f(a)}={f(a,0)}={“a”}, the assertion of fa at its 
zero. {“a”} is the context in which that name applies, obtains. The initial assertion is the context of 
assertion. If a name is being used has a set of applications, we can assume that there is a function of use 
thereby acquire that function in a form of life zeroed for us yet indexed within our repertoire as that 
specific function discernible from others acquired at different times in different contexts. When applied, 
we get {f(a),{“a”}} which is to say A0=“a” to A0’=A1, etc.  A’s only content is a function, thus A(a,x), 
where x indexes the context of the assertion “a”. So, A takes subject displayed by an operation of x and 
object a for its arguments, whose function expresses the identity of x as "a" in the context of A and its 
successors. The object “a” is the concept expressed by f(f(a)), the successor function of application. This 
model of a nominal theory is constructed based on the discussion of presets and prefunctions prior to 
application, existence ratified upon application, where the successor-context constructed by nominal 
assertion cites prior context of application to secure that the object of that assertion, appropriate to 
context, obtains.  
 
A(a,x) such that we assume A(“a=x”) which contextually is just A(x,x). A(x) states the context in which x 
is a member. a=x in A is A given x is a. We put forward that the context in which an object exists is 
named, not the thing itself. These are the conditions in which a name's use is applicable. This is only with 
the possibility of being correct, for use is restricted to the chain of prior application which that assertion 
cites. Not necessarily about correctness as being correct is about the overall model qua reference frame. A 
name is meaningful because applicable within that framework qua context, even if the frame is incorrect. 
Get rid of inconsistent frame, the name no longer applies or should be used.  The function of the 
application of a name we will detail below is as follows. I know that these conditions of which this name 
obtains the appropriate object. It is dubious to say "of" a thing "that" it is the thing satisfying the name. 
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Of/that is contingent, thus not compatible with identity. It is not necessary of/that, i.e. of me, that Victor. 
That/of necessarily holds within lines of context citation based on ordinal construction. In this way, we do 
not have an unrestricted extension of names such that one could say "of" a context "that" a name applies 
from a position external to that context, making that name applicable everywhere, therefore ambiguous. 
We say "that" this is the context "of" which the object named is a member. One cannot export a name into 
any context they want, amounting to an act of quantification into a domain without being a member of it, 
thus knowing what is in it without being in it—see Kripke (2011) and Quine (1956). As per ordinal 
logics, names are indexed to appropriate conditions via successor applications as a function of contexts.9  
 
As an operation, subjectivity is revealed by some relation obtained between input and output that 
indicates some functional activity of subjectivity present but not represented in the set of inputs and 
outputs experienced within a particular state of affairs. However, a change in relations of output, soon 
input for this recursive-operation, expresses a change in subjectivity, indicating a subject at work. If we 
assume the basis for the function of identity indicates some subjective operation, we consider subjects in 
and of themselves as tautologies. This is to say that no one thing about x, A(a,x), is such that of x, x is A, 
the context in which x is situated. Subjectivity embedded in null is expressed by the process in which 
identity emerges in the context formed from b to a above.  
 
Let’s say that there is an identity-function F that indicates a subject by relating input and output as the 
same individual. Let’s call this the tautology, F(x,x). Tautologies, then, are the basis to say any thing, thus 
to say some thing of x is to say that x is F related to itself. The content of the operation asserting “x” is the 
function animating what is known, called, F. For example, for all x, there is a property X such that, 
X=f(x) holds true, for 0=0, 1=1, etc. for x→f(x) and F is the description of that function such that F-ness 
is the expression of the operation characterized F(f(x),x).10 In this way, F for all x states that F(x,x)=F(X).  
 
If input, from repertoire, and output, identity, are different, this operation entails a change in identity, the 
function of which entails a change in context,  
 
                                                      
9 Is it necessary of Victor that he is Black? A statement equivalent to for-all/there-is quantification that may return a vacuous or invalid result. Or, 
is it the case that Victor of which is Black? Making the identity contingent upon definition, i.e. the reference frame constituting the context in 
which the function of that assertion returns the appropriate object of thought? The function of applying that identity has no means of justification 
save for being within a system of categorization that is not necessary to the entity that is labeled Victor, for the function of applying that label 
obtains only when utilized to construct that context. However, because “Black” has a function, its determinate before application allows us to 
understand that there is some operation, some subjectivity, that exhibits “Black”-ness reflected in B/~ intersection with other categories, thus 
partially grounding the expression of many. Because it utilizes the zero of that function, that subject operates outside of an identity with the label 
of a category and, yet, obtains within the form of life expressed by the affairs of subjects whose use of that function expresses various selves in 
the worlds in which they participate without having to predetermine the extension of B-ness. That individual takes up the functional content of B, 
utilizing it in ways that do not obtain given categorical stipulations while retaining that function in its endowment. Each act that does obtain a 
context of expression exhibits an aspect of B-ness unaccounted for within the identity-categorical schema that strictly defines the parameters of 
B. Those parameters themselves dependent upon the frame in which B is member. As part of multiple frames, different aspects of B arise, not 
all. The subject retains the zero of each function it acquires, utilizing those to which it was introduced to construct contexts or by being labeled 
within the context of others, thus co-constructing that context.  
 
All have an initial state, a zero function qua mechanism, making subjectivity a means of expression by this operation, which is triggered once 
placed in particular conditions making for a particular subject. What is exhibited is based on application by subject itself or other 
subjects. Functions can be determined without the operation that runs over the set, whose objects are those functions, being finite thus its output 
predetermined. A capacity exhibiting infinite use of a finite being's means whose products are denumerable but it itself is nondeterminate for it is 
an operation of which the functions determined in context only define that subject after its application of those functions which is not a 
determination, definition of that subject qua capacity, but the function, the identity asserted, of which that same subject has many. The function is 
apparent only when applied in context but this does not imply that the function was not already present otherwise no thing would have been 
expressed. Without input no output. Initial operation merges function of self-assertion with functional content of context. From then on the 
configuration of functions evolves based on the form of life. Most shared for functions cannot stand on their conditions own thus the initial form 
of life creates what we considered humanity within which minor differences comprise unique individuals partially grounded by that initial state 
 
10 Kurt Gödel would state in his analysis of the logic of set-theory that all that is x, the set x, is only conceived by its method of constructing x 
expressing the property X by which x is related to itself. All else is a description of the property exhibited by x which is not a member of the set 
x, but how it is characterized, averting Russell’s paradox. (see Gödel, 1940) 
 
 19 
F(x,y) 
 
That previous identity is F related to another in and only in this context. The failure of a particular 
identity’s application within context can be considered  
 
F(x,not-x) or F(x,y) and y=not-x 
 
These represent contradictions of the identity paradox.  
 
This system is unified by null, the set of no one thing and therefore everything which is considered the 
foundation for any articulation. We can model the construction of contexts with minimal stipulation by a 
negation operator indicating what lies external to the domain to which operations have access. In so 
doing, it is not necessary to define what is in the context, which would leave us with the problem of 
external stipulation once again. What is not necessary for consideration is bracketed and set aside, thereby 
framing the context required for consideration without having to rely on identities which are ambiguous 
to articulation at best, contradictory to the operation overall at worst. Taking a Negation-operator over 
null, it has been shown—by Geach, 1981; Hintikka, 1956; Peterson, 2018; Rodgers and Weihemier, 2012; 
and Wittgenstein, 1922—that any operation can be constructed by that N-operator.11 This simplest 
operation is also clumsy for expository purposes, explain why it is overlooked. 
  
If a system is built up by conditional assertion we can reduce the system of connectives with which 
assertions are constructed by a single operation, N. The function of this N-operator, here a joint negation, 
expresses the concept of null. In so doing,  
 
N(x,not-x) 
 
expresses the validity of the conditional “if x then x,” it is not the case that x and not-x. We also formulate 
the articulation of possible alternative states of affairs. As null is part of every articulation, it is the basis 
from which that articulation was constructed and remains apart from each articulation as the set of any 
one axiom from which different models can be constructed. The individual x must exist in some sense if it 
is negated, just not in the parameters of the context articulated. Just as well, if null is at the core of each 
articulation, the joint set of all possible tautologies, it remains embedded in the chain of successor-
descriptions built off of that core, regardless of its superficial appearance.12 
 
With this understanding, we come to,  
 
F(x,z), G(z,y)  
 
so that F of x and G of y are related by a constant z. 
                                                      
11 For example, an if/then condition in first-order logics is defined as the negation of a true antecedent and false consequent. Our successor-
function above can be defined using this operator: 0, then if not-0 then 1, . . .; which is to say N(0N(N(0)N(1) . . .  
 
12 In this sense, blackness’ subjectivity is an operation maintained across contexts. Its identities under the labels Black, et. al, are separate but not 
mutually exclusive from the function of subjectivity. Identities are context dependent in accordance with the ordinal construction of joint 
successive application modeled above. For within those contexts, to be “Black” entails an operation that pulls from a prior repertoire of identities. 
Thus, blackness is maintained despite its superficial appearance. To be “Black,” or of any of its derivatives,  entails so-called “mixed” 
antecedents. If, in institutionalized programs of Black study, it is maintained that the construct of Race is not interchangeable with a singular 
phenotype, then this should be uncontroversial. However, the controversy that surrounds this assertion indicates the intention to assert one thing, 
but hold on to an inconsistent position to maintain one’s argument for future benefit. Otherwise, if the problem is dismantled without denying its 
existence or just revealed for what it is, its internal contradictions becoming an axiom in a subsequent framework for we know that argument is 
not the case, so would their position. The position would be on shaky ground for the status quo maintained would be shown inconsistent, self-
defeating. This is not necessarily saying that the field would disappear, but would be better for it. We lose by picking which antecedents to call 
upon if and when convenient in order to concretize something, which by definition, is movement.  
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A system that determines z as the output of some function of x and y. The content of z must be f(z), its 
zero, Z, i.e. its Z-ness. The description of that system we would say is Z such that Z(F(x),G(y)). The same 
object obtained by the function of different inputs whose operation indicates the functional content of 
their assertion.  
 
If F(x,y) and G(x,y) then F=G, so different operations can express the same function. The same subject 
qua capacity can be identified in multiple ways. F and G are merely descriptions of the contexts in which 
the operations of that mode of expression, subjectivity, runs. F(x,y) and F(z,w) are different operations, 
although nominally, they are the same function. As such, they indicate an effort of categorization.  
 
F(G(xy)z) represents a concept we will term overdetermination. The function constructing that F-context 
determines the operation of another in order to set the possible roles obtainable by individuals within that 
state of affairs. A description of a description, F of G, is such that F does not have access to x,y but 
defines how G describes their relation, its output. The function of a function, in accordance with Frege, 
expresses a concept; it expresses an operation’s role, its “function,” in constructing a reference frame. 
This should not be too fast of a definition as we have shown how this is plausible based on the successor-
function. We can also think of this based on ordinals. (Turing, 1938) If null unifies the zero of A, B, et. al, 
then each successor of A, B to some n-th place remains in that line, A1. . ., B1…, and so on. A function of 
that successor-operation causing one line to be a subset of another or for them to intersect, causes a pair-
wise partition of those two lines in which an operation is only effective in and only in the scope of that 
newly constructed domain. E.g. F(x,x) implies F(X) namely that F labels the property X of x because x on 
its own is only conceived by f(x) and “x” of x is just x. The function of a function expresses this concept 
by producing an image. Here, if F of G, then F is the domain limiting the scope of the materials available 
to, therefore shaping the image of, G.  These expressions are then incorporated for use in the context of F. 
This is indicated by an operation of z indicating the function F. The terms of G are put to a use other than 
the one they acquired in their initial context.  
 
How does this relate to the construction of a particular endowment brought with the assertion of any one 
identity? The immediate output of these operations populate our state. Changes in the relation one context 
has with others, that identities obtain with others, indicate the operation of some subject utilizing the 
means of their endowment to produce that identity in a way that is not necessarily caused by context, but, 
also, not random. It also accounts for why an identity may not have been experienced in that state-
description. The reality qua relation between contexts of assertion was constructed by utilizing the means 
available in a way appropriate to the context of that assertion. Contexts and the state of affairs composed 
by the relations between them are constructs, and what is a member of one may not be of another. 
However, an identity can be introduced to others by a subject participating in more than one context. The 
functional role of that identity is dependent on the materials available in the context to which that subject 
is introduced. Thus, the same subject has multiple identities and its endowment exists across contextual 
boundaries. The endowment itself is composed of previous identities, functions now “features” of that 
endowment. It is by the function of these features that subjects gain access to other contexts as they 
express properties which are defined by a category which is context dependent. As such, previous 
identities can be applied in different ways based on the features of one’s endowment. The subject utilizes 
its endowment’s contents to construct contexts. The properties of others project a “self” in the shared 
contexts of that state described by their participation in co-constructing that context. It is well known in 
the philosophy of mathematics that every axiomatic theory, here subjectivity, admits of an unlimited 
number of concrete theorems, here identities, besides those from which the originating identities were 
derived, here an endowment. A cultural endowment as a form of life is therefore the domain in which this 
particular function obtains. The aggregate of these functions are the “features” of the endowment. If 
modes of expression are ways of being in the world (Baraka/Jones, 1963; Wittgenstein, 1953) then that 
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form of life is indicated by a relation obtained between assertions as arguments of functions of 
construction.  
 
If x is a particular set of features, “x” by itself is a tautology, it says no one thing on its own but 
potentially may be utilized to do so. We can assume if “x” is to be expressed, in the least it is an argument 
of its own function asserting itself: F(x,x). From this it follows that every individual implies a mode of 
expression. This mode of expression is indicative of the form of life from which it was articulated and 
relates the arguments of various individuals which are distinct but not mutually exclusive. We have 
shown that modes of life can be considered predicates by their function over operations. F(x,z), G(y,z) for 
y implies G(y,y) so a state F-G organized around z relating x and y. That state description is a relation 
between contexts composing a state of affairs which is only valid when the ordinal construction of the 
contexts that compose them are valid, the function relating contexts as arguments. As a constant, “z” 
represents how these individuals are related within the state of F-G.   
 
As the function of the relation between operations as arguments, F-G are the apparent identities of the 
subject within a context whose parameters are understood by the limits to the function of F,G available in 
that environment. These operations obtain the same object, so we say that the function of contexts F and 
G are equivalent. Equivalent in the fact that they indicate similar operations but are not interchangeable. 
From this we can posit a function expressing the concept of this operation as Z(F,G), a description of the 
operation of z expressing Z-ness. F-G relates the operations expressing x,y. It follows that if the set of the 
features of x,y obtain the same relation to z, then Z obtains the features of both F and G. We shall call this 
obtaining an affinity. We do not require an identity relation for it is sufficient to show the construction of 
the class Z and its members.  
 
We will do this by saying that ~ represents a relation between arguments. In this way, “z” is the property 
of being labeled Z. So the relationship expressing the features qua function of Z will be illustrated as 
Z/~.13 We should take care that we understand that the “features” of an endowment are functions, the 
objects of the endowment exhibited by the operation of those functions appear as the features whose 
relation within a particular context project the identity applicable within that context.  
 
From here it suffices that we can prove a cultural endowment from the individual arguments that enter 
into such an operation. The function of these operations express subjectivity. The expression of this 
endowment is had by the operation of subjects that relate the objects of their environment in such a way 
that actively constructs the context in which that identity is asserted, placing them in the state of affairs in 
which their individual contexts are related. The relation between predicates attributed to this operation 
represent the relation between individuals, the structure of which is the state description. Thus, in 
accordance with Henry Louis Gates Jr, (1988) this endowment becomes a repertoire of signifying 
practices, utilizing the shared features of that context by some property that is not a member of Z and, 
thereby, is representative of another individual’s repertoire. Those features not of Z and not of that 
individual are of some other individual that is a part of neither context. By virtue of this, the null set 
unifies the system.  
 
We show this in the following way. If we have x such that F(x,x), then the context expressed by the 
relation obtained by functions whose operation construct F/~, understood by an operation that gives us 
features whose function is f in x. Each f in x gives us a feature whose operation expresses an [f] of the 
context, form of life, of F. We represent this by F/~[f], which is to say that there is a function whose 
underlying operation expresses F-ness. In this way f~f’ can be shown for an individual x, the active 
construction of the features of x, which go on to give us all [f]-successors in F. Effectively, experiencing a 
change in the [f] of F resembles a change in the f’s of x. The changes in input/output claims displays the 
                                                      
13 For a more detailed description of this concept, see the notion of presets and prefunctions detailed by work at nLab (2019).  
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function indicative of the operation expressing subjectivity without having to predetermine or stipulate its 
being interchangeable with something that it is not—see Appiah (1985). Changes in relations between the 
outputs of this operation, thereby, making a change in the context dictating which identities are applicable 
and which are not, model some change in the aspects of the subject constructing that context based on the 
inputs available. That subject is embedded in the contexts it creates. An “individual,” then, is expressed 
by the relation holding the features of a context together, not the features in and of themselves.  
 
An identity operation that seeks to construct a system of categories in order to determine whether or not a 
particular aspect of an individual is a member of that state of affairs, thereby is that individual, fails. We 
know this from above, as “x”=X and F(x,x)=F(X) which cannot be proven on its own for by definition 
X=f(x) which makes for F(0), a label of no one thing. A relation in the cultural endowment does not tell 
us whether that identity holds in the state of affairs constructed. F/~ is incomplete as far as the 
decidability of categorization goes. The members of F/~ are present in Z/~ but are not necessarily 
represented there. We cannot determine, save by some other operation, if f=z. As a matter of fact, [f] 
cannot be identical with [z] for then we would run into the identity paradox. With each stipulation of a 
feature’s being identical to an individual by the category denoting some contextually determined property 
affixed to that feature, there must be another feature generated that represents what the former is not in 
order to secure that determination. In turn, this occurrence makes every stipulation more ambiguous as 
more features are definitionally fixed for some property, determining the category of which that 
individual is a member. For each name affixed to feature, (n2-n) features must be proven outside that 
categorization in order to prove its validity.  
 
Identity cannot prove itself on its own. In substantiating a singular identity for all, the required number of 
individuals outside of that category in order to the frame members of that category to make n=1, a 
universal stipulation, is (12-1)=0. For a single category given no one, 1/0=, and as such is non-
determinate. So much for homogeneous identity claims. It is more likely that Z/~ would cannibalize itself 
as it constructs the context of its assertion based on what it is not. All the material supporting its assertion 
would be called into question or negated in order to secure an identity imposed from some other context 
external to the context currently inhabited. The relation exhibited by the operations of x can only be 
obtained within and only within F/~ as each [f] can gain access to F or F’ by virtue of being able to show 
that f-successor constructed in x from its endowment. Since not-f and f can be proven within the system 
Z, making f and z interchangeable so as to complete a universal description of that system, this process 
leads to a contradiction in the overall onto-epistemology (da Silva, 2007) of that state of affairs. 
Overdetermination, then, cannot be complete due to the identity paradox. The mere instantiation of an 
identity whose dominance indicates its inability to be proven within the system of categorization, because 
it organizes that state, requires the production of that which can disprove that position lying just outside 
the framework imposed. For without that negated region, no framework would be discernible. Hence, our 
focus on the capacity to articulate forms of life, not the holding of some thing that is to be definitive, 
regardless of context, despite that form of life.  
 
Take the collection of functions as objects of x’s mode of expression. As there is no one feature 
interchangeable with x, then any feature of x can be conceived without having to quantify each one. 
Features are the functions qua constituents of “x” in whichever context, F, x is asserted. Call this feature 
f0. We can describe a group by creating a set of those features without ordering them, call this {f}. From 
this we have [f1] of F. The next would be {f,{f}} in x which is [f2] of F, and so on. As there is no way, 
save by stipulation to know all the features that comprise x, we make it a nondeterminate, yet 
denumerable, collection. The total features of x is a known unknown, which is not to say that x is 
indeterminate or unknowable as it can be shown constructible. This collection of all features displays the 
concept that x’s endowment is null for not a part, as of yet, of any one context. The endowment is 
composed of the zeroes of the functions qua features of and to which x has acquired. Thus, by negation 
we have an affirmation of this qualia without a stipulation of quantity.  
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Take the following.  
 
F0=(f1...fn) 
G0=(e1...en) 
 
F0=G0, just so long as 
 
f0=e0 
 
and, f1e1 
 
Effectively, we have described an axiom of foundation. As there is a f0 and e0 as a member of each 
individual but not a part of their type distinctions, we can say that outside of identity there is a subject and 
hence a cultural endowment unified in null. That subject can be a part of F or G and yet remain apart from 
them in order to enter into alternative relations. This is the case for subjectivity is an operation, not a 
thing. Each feature gains that individual access to an alternative context which if taken from the 
contextual view, if that feature does not appear, we would say that that subject does not exist, their 
identity would be necessary to subjectivity. However, we know that this is not the case for x’s role within 
different or the same state of affairs can be F or G. A single subject may have multiple identities 
dependent upon the context and yet remain the same subject. Also, that same identity, i.e. functional type, 
may obtain multiple subjects. It would be ridiculous, if not trivial to say that what is given is all there is. 
Everything may follow from something that is or is not the case; however, it is not always plausible that 
because something happened it must always be the case.  
 
We can set up this simple operation producing features f of x’s endowment by taking a collection of 
functions and calling that the set {f} in x of type-F represented, [f]. In this way, F has no scope on its own 
as all f in x are 0 in F for we have determined no one feature of F. By taking a set of that set, we have 
{f,{f}} of x in F which represents [f’] of F. The relation between f1~[f’] in F is understood as a function 
representing the operation in x of {f} to {f,{f}}. We state that the functions in x, the ways in which x is F 
related to itself, are features of F whose overall function expresses F-ness by an operation in the 
endowment utilized by x.   
 
We can do this for y, whose mode of expression through G is a feature [e] modeling e in y of type-G. In 
accordance with articulation theory, the aggregate of the pairings of features from x and y represents the 
intersection of their states of affairs at z. That state, call it Z, is the aggregate of those pairings, the 
structure of the context articulated from the set of conditions comprised by F,G.  
 
As different operations may obtain the same state of affairs, articulation theory states that,  
 
Z/~[[f1, e1],[f2, e2],...] 
 
Therefore, rearticulation is such that G’ is  
 
[e0,...g[ej...em]...en] 
 
Z becomes,  
 
Z/~[[f1, e2],[f2, e3],...] 
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The operation indicating the subject is not only an extension of subjectivity identified within an 
appropriate context, because co-constructive of that context, but is also a deepening of the endowment. 
Within {0} from 0 we get, {0,{0}}, {0,{0}, {0,{0}}}, and so on, illustrating that within that initial finite 
context, there are plausibly infinitely many uses within that partition of null utilizing the functions of a 
subject’s endowment. We also show that from 0 to {0}, {{0}}, {{{0}}}, {{{{0}}}}, and so on, 
demonstrates the extension of that subject’s endowment across contexts. That progression is equivalent to 
0, {0}=1, {0,1}=2, {0,1,2}=3, etc. such that we have <n<x1...xn>
n> equivalent to <<x1...xn>>. Each x 
numeral represents a context citation, the members of each set the extension of the subject’s endowment 
across and based on the prior construction of and participation in those contexts. Adding or taking away 0 
from a context does not change the identity of that context as long as the particular framework remains 
intact. Thus, it is safe to assume that null is both a part of and apart from every articulation is 
uncontroversial. The operation of subjectivity is displayed by the active construction of these structures, 
not what is housed within them or by stipulating what those structures are which nevertheless relies on a 
frame of reference externally applied to the object of study.  
 
As a result, we find that as Black identities become stricter and more narrow, blackness’ subjectivity 
expands and deepens. Those depths are not altogether visible, accessible, to categories. The efforts to 
overdetermine and secure the referents of those categorical labels to ontological commitments are not 
definitive. Blackness grows exponentially with each attempt to restrict its expressions in different spheres. 
Much like Z-ness, we can show that B-ness is in excess of any finite categorization as it is exhibited by its 
method of construction and, dependent upon context, may appear under a different category housed 
within the endowed capacities present by not represented in any one of those finite categories. White 
homogeneity violates these rules of construction in the very act of its assertion—see appendix. Its 
extension is exhausted in one context. To extend a context over all others has no means of justification, 
for what is required is in a successor-context that, when evoked, automatically calls into question the 
validity of the domination of that former context and its ability to stand on its own. 
 
Overdetermination cannot be complete for it is a concept relative to context. As a recursive operation, the 
articulation of subjectivity from a previous and continuously constructed endowment, based on the 
accumulation of prior functions developed as the capacities of that subject introduced, co-constructs the 
contexts of which the relation between subjects structuring our state of affairs. That endowment must be 
in excess of the context of any singular identity function’s domain. Otherwise there would be no base for 
future articulations. We can think of the endowment as the residual from the identity paradox. The 
repertoire, then, is constructed with each instantiation of an identity. The context of its assertion can only 
be maintained if there are objects outside of the domain of that context, proving  its efficacy as its domain 
is determined. In fact, we know that the repertoire grows at a rate of (n2-n) for each context determined by 
the assertion of some identity (n). Just as well the function of any proposition can be built up using only 
the N-operator, whose function is based off of null assumptions. If not, identities would be static and 
applicable everywhere, thus useless, not uniquely determining any one thing.  
 
The operation of “x” indicates a particular endowment present but not represented within the particular 
domain or context in which it currently functions. We have also shown that the concept of 
overdetermination, predetermining the value and therefore the functional role of an individual from one 
context within the domain of another, cannot be complete. Through this, the failure of universal identity 
stipulations based on the assumption that an individual does not have a particular endowment is seriously 
flawed, if not self-defeating. This has major implications for the study of blackness, B-ness is not 
necessarily defined by B on its own. The operation expressing subjectivity is embedded in, because 
actively constructs, its cultural endowment.  
 
As a result, the set of functions it contains, links assertion to context by the same input producing various 
successors as output. Each feature of the endowment indicates another property with which that 
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individual is related to context. Thus, the same individual can become a member of multiple states of 
affairs without exhausting its subjectivity’s repertoire. The use of endowed functions express a part of the 
stock of “self” via the identities available, yet portions of its self remain apart from the context presently 
inhabited. The self in itself is only had by an operation and therefore is this operation, within, because 
constructing, each successive articulation of its subjectivity. Without this, there is no hope of explaining 
the active construction of a form of life that does not presuppose the identities therein. If presupposed, 
those identities, without an explanation of how they came to be in the first place, are vacuous.  
 
We say this in order to state that there is no need to overdetermine what B-ness, e.g. blackness, is by 
predetermining who does or does not fit into a category based on some property only known by the 
function that property obtains in expressing a form of life. The expression of that form of life is not 
necessarily what the label denotes. For those under that labe,l it is inevitable that they can be found 
utilizing or under others while remaining themselves. We need not rely on identity theory in order to 
formulate a theory of subjectivity. Stating that membership to category determines existence rests on 
shaky ground. No account is made of how the system got there in the first place in previous identity 
theories. Relying on such a theory presupposes a theory of subjectivity. As mode of expression is 
subjectivity, it is an operation which implies a method of constructing those expressions—infinite use of 
finite means. A method of constructing an explanation was shown in order to detail what F-ness is in the 
first place. F-ness cannot be “F,” for F would be so just in case it is not-F. So each feature of x being put 
to use to express no one thing of x, but possibly some thing, automatically allows us to ascertain that 
feature as one of type-F. In fact, the operation expressing subjectivity populates the worlds, context, in 
which the identity as the function those objects of thought, exists. In showing how categories can only be 
grasped by their method of construction, which in turn implies an operation of construction and, thus, 
relating the entity constructing that system in the system that appears, we obtain a sufficient theory of 
subjectivity. As a bonus we get the underpinnings for an attempt at explaining how identity works without 
having to presuppose it by relying on mere stipulation with tenuous justification for assertion.  
 
IV.  
 
So far, we have shown how the internal operations of functions can be constructed. In so doing, functions 
become the “objects” of one’s endowment, objects of thought. Intuitively, the move from no one thing to 
a set of things, and to a set of that set, resembles the move from 0 to 1, then 2. This resemblance indicates 
that there is some function present which is indicative of a relation between operations over two sets, one 
later considered input the other output. That function is not a thing present in the change. The function is 
revealed by the changes in input related to changes in output. An endowment is based on the construction 
of operations revealed as functions which later become predicates whose function are visible once 
applied. Predicates considered as functions—a description of x being F, such that x is F related to itself, 
e.g. F(x,x)—must have arguments. We can infer the presence of some operation that must be at work in 
order to construct the entity that houses these arguments. We understand F(x,x) but if set to a, ax=f(a,x), 
thus the identity of a, is the relation between that label and the context of its assertion where numerals 
x=1,2,3,... are understood by set, thereby context, theoretical construction—see von Neumann ordinals, 0 
to 0{0}, {0, {0}}, etc. which is 0=0, {0}=1, {0,1}=2, etc. respectively. A set from everything possible can 
be a set from that set and so on, or another set distinct from the former, or a set of the set and those 
therein, contexts and types of contexts, or relations between them. If reference was based on the exchange 
of name for referent, a=b, the method of application vanishes and the identity or name is applicable 
everywhere and nowhere. We understand F within it context of assertion by its function f which indicates 
but is not interchangeable the with the expression of F-ness, the subject of that expression is the function 
of expression. 
 
Functions as the content of one’s endowment construct contexts of assertion. Predicates are the function 
of the arguments available within a particular context that individuals take up and put to use to project an 
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identity that becomes an object in the context of others doing the same. This is how contexts come to be 
related in such a way to compose a state of affairs. An endowment composed of functions, f, as the 
content of its expressions is considered under the scheme,  
 
f:=a→f(a)  
 
so that if “a”=f(0), f(a)=a’ when applied to some purpose. We state that if an object is plausible, there is a 
function of that object’s construction, otherwise that object would be nothing. Changes in the relation 
between a set of inputs and changes in a set of outputs determine the role that object plays in the 
construction of our state of affairs qua each other’s reference frames. The objects that make up that state 
description indicate the operation of a function, even if that object is a function of its self. A context is 
known by the projection of an individual’s identity as a function of their endowment within the context of 
that identity’s instantiation. As such, a diagonalization argument can be developed where as a table is 
constructed such that functions are subscripted to infinity, as the rows, and variables, as columns. This 
proof shows that the universal, self-referential, statement of systems cannot be proven in the systems they 
export. This also ensures that different cultural endowments built up by an operation over functions 
applied when applicable, because constructive of the contexts of their application, are possible when a 
diagonal is drawn across this table. With such a diagonal it become obvious that f0(a0)f1(a1), i.e. 
f(0)f(1). The unprovable statement is represented in each system indicated by the row. Each column is 
not empty but may or may not be put in relation with others so as to make a composite, co-constitutive, 
state of affairs. It is not necessarily the case that constructs are such that they overdetermine the output in 
one context for the sake of valuations in another.14  
 
Implicit here is a critique of behaviorism’s focus on output alone and its assumption or negation of this 
prior operation. Behaviorist disregard how output emerges in the first place. This course of actions misses 
the point because a function is no thing. Behaviorists’ focus on external data does not account for how 
one organizes that data and assumes the system of categorization as implied in the data. Inevitably, this 
brings us back to the same problem of how those descriptions were constructed; back to the question of 
how and what produced the data externalized just as how the analyst externalized the system of 
categorization employed? On its own, a function says no one thing, but placed in the appropriate context 
because constructing that context, produces the correct output qua context thus conditions for appropriate 
subsequent input for reference to obtain in later assertions.iii 
 
As modes of expression are the modalities in which beings are in the world, a cultural endowment, in 
accordance with what LeRoi Jones/Amiri Baraka and following Wittgenstein, is a collective 
improvisation. Improvisation is no longer an ambiguous term. It is the capacity to make infinite use of 
finite means, appropriate to context because constructive of contexts, therefore, not random but indicative 
of subjectivity. In this way, blackness is not interchangeable with one and only one thing within any 
historically constructed frame of reference. It is also contemporary, immediate, as blackness is the 
capacity to express many selves yet retain its subject’s continuity.  
 
This comes with the idea that a form of life is such because of an affinity of signifying practices that lies 
outside of the intervals categorized over the arc of that mode of expression. The identity paradox comes 
                                                      
14 Diagonalization states that for all n labeled N, if there is a function fn(n), it would follow that f(n)=fn(n)+1=f(n)+1, a contradiction. Gödel 
showed that this can be conceived because it can be constructed, computable, by coding the inconsistency. By Turing, that inconsistency would 
be stored as an axiom from which a successor frame of reference can handle this concept because it was used to construct the frame in which that 
function is applicable. Gödel was concerned with encoding self-reference, hence our theory of the assertion of names as only having functional 
content. Our theory takes the form f(a,x)=“a” so that x=1,2,3 which are the contexts of application based on ordinal construction. After Gödel, we 
would say if “a”=A, then in A, we have  the function for which “a” applies and the definite operation paired with that function of application 
when appropriate indexed by that method of construction, i.e. computation. 
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about when an interval is supposed interchangeable with that arc. One must participate in the active 
construction of that form of life. If not, then to quantify into that opaque endowment from an external 
stance misses the mark of what is actually there. (Quine, 1956) Blackness is an affinity between many 
modes of being, which if we do not rely on identity, other forms of life may enter into an affinity with it. 
However, to quantify into blackness so as to determine its value for use in a context in which it is barred 
from actively constructing does not make the one doing the quantification “Black.” That identity is not 
the operation expressive of blackness, but makes that entity negate all that makes that identity what it is. 
This reveals an attempt at dispossession so as to construct its own context which will remain void, for that 
identifier is at the expense of what animated it in the first place. As contexts are built ordinally, this act 
cannot be disavowed, accountability can be tracked by the only content of the propositions of that 
external position. Its function is constructive of that void because it displays an extractive system of 
categorization, hence control.  
 
Why do certain features whose function express a form of life come together? From external stipulations. 
However, although grouped in such a way, because of the subjects capacity make infinite use of finite 
means, a form of life develops which is not at the expense of the individuals therein. Their modes of 
expression are different and remain such, but reach an affinity which co-construct that form of life. They  
relate the contexts of their assertions in such a way that constructs a state of affairs that is not a monolith, 
indicating a people that is not such either. In so doing, there is the capacity to rearticulate states of affairs 
without denying the historical conditions of their construction as well as without denying the creative 
potential in the multiple realities represented. These are real because modes of expression harbor 
consequences for the one’s doing the construction. To actualize different or at least one of those realities 
implies articulation. “Actual” is its function within a reference frame. The issue of how reality and actual 
interface is one for contemporary study, however, in rearticulating that frame, since looking through a 
frame one cannot picture the frame itself, we change the framework in which actualities emerge. 
Correlation has little to do with causality, identity is contingent upon subjectivity. Identity did not 
necessarily cause subjectivity however that subject can utilize the finite means once placed in that group 
to articulate a self not necessarily caused by their historical condition but without denying them; thus 
rearticulating that groups relation to and with the others that make up that system. Those defined within 
that system can temporarily benefit from it. As systems are constructed the work is done towards the 
benefit of the one who constructed it. Since the propositions expressed from endowments only content are 
functions, they express nothing until applied and once applied relate the function of assertion to the 
context of application.15  
 
Our theory is not the deployment of tokens or representations, the superficial appearance of what comes 
out one’s mouth, but the deployment of functions which in each successive application gain their 
character. In this way, someone can utilize a phrase taken to be one way but “meant” in another. The use 
still is valid to the utterer, as the function of that phrase as its been constructed over successive 
deployments maps the way it is used to the context of appropriate application. Just as well, those others 
may acquire what may by its use further the strictness of their determined position in that state to the 
benefit of another no longer in the picture. Structured thus, when contexts of assertion are then related so 
as to provide the architecture of our state of affairs, the utterer can be held accountable for the function of 
that phrase as others acquire that function in their repertoire. To acquire that function is to have that 
concept such that the concept is expressed by the function of the function applied, which is to say that one 
has the function and because co-constructing the context, can also apply it. They have the determinate of 
                                                      
15 For example, an endowment is the software and as such is a bundle of instructions without input. Without input, no output; however, because 
developed, its uses become a repertoire constructed by the contexts in which and to which it is applied. From use, software becomes an 
application. If not applied, its assertions on their own are empty, therefore are not assertions at all. From an initial state, software is developed by 
an assertion which sets the first limits for the type of input sought after for future output, thus giving us unique modes of expression both from the 
endowment being developed and in contrast to others.  
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the function F(x,x) and their assertion of f(x) is the input to an operation constructing a context related to 
others whose object is a constant within the state of affairs of the individuals functional construct of the 
contexts that make up that state of affairs.  
 
In sum, the smallest common denominator of all subject’s projection of an identity in the appropriate 
context is 0, for that identity is only such by way of its method of construction from null. Thus, as that 
denominator, subjectivity is a generative faculty, an inner creative capacity, for 1/0=. Just the same, the 
common identity to all is null. Making an analysis with identity as primary is a wrong start because it is 
not a necessary constituent of subjectivity. Therefore, inter/infra-subjectivity is theoretically plausible 
because constructible outside of strict adherence to finite categorization stipulated as universal over 
subjects across contexts. Subjectivity is the capacity to make infinite use of finite means. If universally 
stipulated, this then is a reflection of what is required for the one making the imposition, thus a part of 
their identity, not the one identified. We arrive at a constructive idea of the concept of states of affairs and 
affinity. A state of affairs is expressed as a function of the relation obtained between the contexts of 
identity assertion, a coalition between identities. An affinity is inter/infra-subjective, a pair-wise operation 
between the functions as content of the expression of subjectivities utilizing an endowment qua repertoire 
of signifying practices. If someone attempts to quantify from one context into the endowment 
constructing another, as per Quine, that quantification either leads to inconsistencies or vacuous 
propositions. By showing how different endowments construct their respective frames of reference as 
well as enter into relations with each other, we show that it is possible that each endowment can maintain 
its integrity without incorporating content by dispossessing others of that which their form of life 
constructs, i.e. without what is most often nonchalantly proposed as and uncritically interrogated under 
the label of appropriation.  
 
V.  
 
The purpose of this essay was to attempt to develop, as best we can, a working theory of subjectivity in 
order to account for blackness as a mode of expression therefore its way of being in the world. In so 
doing, we would be able to explore and provide proof of the concept of a cultural endowment, the active 
construction of the subjective continuity of a people by virtue of the activity of its subjects even if from a 
null state. As a bonus, we showed that null is not void. Rather, it is the set of no one thing and therefore 
the set that provides the material to articulate any thing. As such, the possibility of constructing contexts 
in which identity can be asserted with the least amount of assumptions was determined by some operation 
over null. This was done to disprove a prevailing notion in the study of Black-ness within Critical Race 
theory called Afro-Pessimism (Patterson, 1982; Sexton, 2016; Wilderson III, 2008;  et. al) This theory 
supposes that blackness is absolute nothing and operates out of a cultural death. The Pessimist is wrong 
for their determination of blackness presupposes its being interchangeable with a finite set of identities 
characterized by their axiological determination as absolutely nothing. Designating that blackness is only 
a predicate interchangeable with subjectivity fails when the logical structure of the Pessimist’s claim is 
considered critically. So constructed, the Pessimist’s determination is vacuous, x=F(…); or indeterminate, 
either x or F; or self-defeating, F(x) assumes x is, therefore not absolutely nothing. It is contradictory 
because blackness is expressed by an operation, it is not a thing that can be exchanged for a predicate that 
inevitably is void because devoid of argument. Therefore, blackness is a member of the multiple contexts 
which it constructs under different names. Blackness cannot be a void for it actively constructs a 
repertoire from the contexts in which it participates. It cannot be nothing for it is no one thing but 
operation that can go on to express any thing appropriate to context because it makes use of the means 
therein. As such, the Pessimist position should be given up. Even the use of silence is proof of the 
functional content of assertions. We know that F on its own is equivalent to f(0), the basis for assertion at 
all. Its use can show inconsistencies in the state constructed or realize different relations latent therein. 
The potential to construct alternative, correct or discard inconsistent models/contexts, lies at f(0), which is 
where contexts connect forming our states of affairs. We know this because current realities, and possible 
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new ones, meet at their disjoint union in null, connecting us with others. The difference between mere 
static and music are the silences which hold the relation between utterances, revealing the syncopated 
output as song.   
 
If we were to say, “for all Blacks there exists a label,” this quantification is equivalent to, “there does not 
exist a Black for which it is not-not for all labeled not the case.” The quantifier “all” is equivalent to 
“there-does-not-exist-an-entity-such-that-it-is-not-the-case,” and “there-exists” is equivalent to “not for 
all not.” This statement proves that there does exist some Black that is not under that label. Most likely, 
there are no Blacks that obtain that label for the formula returns not-Black Blacks or a label that labels no-
(one)-thing. This Russellian paradox allows us to see how one can state something without that statement 
capturing any one thing. Revealed as merely a contextually dependent description, we show the Pessimist 
can talk about Black/African-American identity as being nothing without there actually being individuals 
whose operation expresses the form of life of blackness in such a way that obtain that description. As a 
result, we can explain why the surface appearance of the statement seems true, but is actually empty. The 
predicament of the Pessimist stands as the sign of an erroneous judgment bent towards maintaining a 
problem for benefit, rather than analyzing it. By treating identities as names, the same subject can have 
multiple names but in context they are the “subject” of only one. Contextual definite descriptions of 
individual show that a name is a label applied to a property indicated by a single feature of the many that 
individual possesses. Names then are not the individual but their use indicate the system of identification 
organizing that state of affairs. As an individual has multiple features, each indicating a different property 
that gains it access to multiple categories, identification is internally necessary within context, but identity 
itself is contingent to context when it purports it is not. 
 
We have demonstrated this on two fronts. A description or identifier cannot stand on its own. This would 
be akin to a sentence without object, i.e. its contexts, and the object the function therein being the 
“subject” of this activity. The function of a description with absolutely no argument returns nothing. As 
such, it would not be a valid description and is self-defeating. Identifiers, names, rigid designations, etc. 
have no scope unless applied to, i.e. become a function of, some object. Thus, F(x) is just F(x,x) for x is F 
related to itself in the context indicated by the function of F. x is x and no other thing. Blackness is 
blackness and no other thing. A movement is movement, and not another thing. Hence our treatment of 
blackness’ subjectivity as a vector so as to emphasize that point. F(x,0) affirms x and its relative 
description as applicable in no one context. F0 is a member of the set of all possible state descriptions. 
F(0) returns 0 when F attempts to stand on its own—indiscernible, from an external stance, because the 
zeroed determinate as functional content of any predicate qua label, G,Z, etc., remains so to others until 
applied. However, the existence of these functions are still representable before application. Therefore, 0 
affirms that that which is labeled nothing must exist, in some sense in order to be labeled at all. However, 
the function of that identity says nothing for no one operation is utilizing F to say something of its 
self/world. “Absolute nothing” is merely a description of a thing even if it disavows that thing in order to 
assert itself. What it disavows must exist in some sense, namely, not in the context in which F exists. 
Afro-Pessimism, then, is the vacuous proposition, not blackness; for blackness is an expression of 
subjectivity.  
 
So, we state that F(0) connotes the property of nothing which those that fall under some category after the 
application of the name of that property express the concept nothing. As such, nothing would be 
universally applicable, therefore useless. As null is the only property which has itself as sole member, null 
is both part of every category constructed, for they are successors from null, and yet remains apart from 
each category. What is in excess of the partition of null that falls under that label becomes the material for 
further articulations. If blackness is null according to the Pessimist, then everything follows from 
blackness. If an operation over null indicates the presence of subjectivity, then affinities between different 
subjects is possible. Divisions by virtue of one’s discernment between identities are a matter of 
stipulation. Their function to some end, which may or may not be useful, but is not necessary to a 
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working theory of subjectivity, is applicable only to the context under consideration. We also see how if 
starting from identity, alternatives can be constructed through the very same subject-operation, utilizing 
those means and displaying a transfinite continuity despite the imposition of finite contexts organized by 
the system of categorization in which those identities are available. This is so we do not deny the world 
order, the racialized injunction we have found or do find ourselves in currently. Null is a member of every 
set and yet the only set that can stand on its own for F(0)=0 no matter what the operation or the category 
applied. Thus, how terms operate is a more fruitful conversation than how they are defined. Definitions 
are dependent upon and only useful in and only in the contexts which they actively construct. As Amiri 
Baraka would state in 1965, Hell is our definitions.  
 
The implication of this finding is the conclusion that the rearrangement of the features which indicate 
subjects being members of some endowment changes the property expressed by an operation over that 
endowment. Dependent upon the context in which the subject projects itself in that context, subjects 
become the object of the function of another’s repertoire. We can make clear the distinction between 
identity and identification via the overdetermination of one’s modes of expression, thus way of being in 
the world. Identification is a function of a predicate applied to a projection of one’s subjectivity. As such, 
and in defining what that subject is within other contexts, the relation between the contexts of assertion 
composing our state of affairs, a definition of a definition over a subject, is not complete. The subject is in 
excess of any one identity because it participates in a multitude of contexts. However, once the function 
of these terms are the focus, their use towards some end become explicit so that terms previously 
innocuous are revealed to maintain and make more strict the system of categorization and the 
commitments it entails. Explicit now are the acts ensuring benefits of use for one context from the means 
generating whatever value to be derived in another. As shown above, the “content” of an expression, if 
any, is its function, not some thing, as indicated by the appropriate context in which it is applied.16 The 
context in which it is applied indicates the concept which the behavior of that expression displays. Thus, 
an expression’s use indicates the context of that use, determines that context. A phrase used in a “racist” 
way indicates a racist context. One organized by the commitments the deployment of the concept of 
racism by way of taking advantage of that system, the function of the identifier in that phrase, entails. 
This is so regardless of the superficial appearance of that phrase, as it is that phrase’s use that constructs 
that context which appropriately characterizes its content. The function being the object asserted within 
the context indicated by the use of that phrase, under the label which it actually represents. That racist 
function is the content of that phrase. Change the property alone, one just reduplicates that endowment 
and its individuals under a different name but continuity is maintained.  
 
In summary, an endowment is a repertoire of functions constructed and accumulated as one instantiates 
contexts by virtue of the assertion of an identity by some operation. Subjectivity is this operation that runs 
over that endowment of functions in order to express a self within the context constructed. Identity is the 
projection, output, expressed and the input for future articulation, here rearticulations. Subjectivity’s 
assertion of a self actively constructs the contexts in which the assertion of that identity is appropriate. 
Each identity indicates the context of its assertion, the relation between these contexts structure the state 
of affairs of the individuals who actively participate determining that state.  
 
This leads us to the importance of this finding. To assume that one can change the world before they 
change themselves assumes that one is separate from the world. This is not to say to not help people, but 
in changing world with the idea that one is separate from it, only treats the effects/products of systems 
without attending to the conditions in which those issues recursively emerge and thus doomed to repeat 
                                                      
16 See Appiah (1985) on assertion and conditionals alongside our treatment of the ordinal construction of contexts appropriate for the application 
of an expression as a function from the stock of the subject’s endowment. In fact, Appiah develops his theory based on unified partitions within 
null. For example, we conditionalize on the extent that R is the case within the partition [(R),(not-R)] deriving all possible from the calculation 
p(R) such that R-[1-(not-R)]; which if, in his terms conditionalization, in ours articulation, the construction of contexts based on our N-operation 
utilized by subjectivity, is if R then R states not-R or R which is to say not-R+R, the disjoint union of if R is the case, unified in null. 
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those same issues. The articulation of self, implicates one in the articulation of the contexts in which they 
participate. Changing the world before a change in self reduplicates issues of self in the world. That world 
is made in the image of, as a function of, the author(ity) assumed separate and independent from it. We 
have shown that this assumption leaves the assertions of that sole individual either vacuous or null. If 
null, assertion re-implicates them with the others participating in the construction of that context. The 
transcendentalist become the means of their own subordination. One is themselves because they have the 
property of being in the context which they actively construct. One cannot disassociate themselves from 
the contexts they actively participate in and therefore construct, so it follows that trying to change an 
individual other than self in context, does not change context. Thus, one is only a self because in the 
world of others and for each other they are because of the same operation. This is what LeRoi 
Jones/Amiri Baraka called a collective improvisation. Others are because they’re in my world; and I am 
because I am in others. A change in one’s self-operation marks a change in the world one actively 
constructs by being in it and has the added benefit of changing the structures through which a world, our 
world, is expressed. Changing self so that context changes, alternative contexts arise and inconsistent 
ones return empty results, capturing nothing. In this way, one reaches affinities with others rather than 
subjecting others under a singular domain. This can work in the opposite way, however, because those 
working towards homogeneous structurings of their world, enacting a system for self at the expense of 
those whose operation provides the value of and for that world, those models fail to be consistent nor are 
they sustainable.  
 
As contexts are constructed by the assertion of "self," implying the world inhabited by that self, changes 
in context, marks changes in “mind,” thus a change in worlds. Certain functions, identities, become 
inapplicable and ridiculous to assert. This is how we could attend to issues of racism and other forms of 
subordination. Alternative structures become necessarily possible. It is almost too much to ask to change 
minds directly. One cannot peer in, see and rearrange the stock of metaphysical things that constitute 
another's mind—see Kripke’s Wittgenstein (1982). However, working on the self as a member of the 
contexts in which they participate with others, otherwise there is no “self” to be had, changes the context 
and what is expressed. In this way, we have a better understanding of why that same Baraka would say 
that we must attack with a hundred shades of Black, not just one regardless of which side of the color line 
an imposition of a singular identity comes from. Based on affinity rather than coalitions, we state that 
affinity is not based on interests. Interests imply an asymmetry in structure, the imposition of dominant 
and subordinate positions. Affinity is a relation engendered by the coming together of conditions as the 
context of individual’s assertions of self, independent but not mutually exclusive. Derrick Bell Jr. (1980) 
would analyze the convergence of interests as having the adverse effect of concessions made if and only 
if benefits can be controlled by the one making them.  
 
Above we stated that an endowment is constituted by the zero of multiple functions, determinate to the 
possessor, but as yet experienced by others for they have not been applied. Starts from an initial state, a 
function that merges self with the assertion, the construction, of their initial world which is not-self; the 
disjoint union of which displays the functional relation of one’s-self in that world. From then on 
successive applications of that function relates that subject with others, thereby acquiring different 
functions as objects whose application constitutes that subject's state of affairs with other subjects, 
contexts, and reference frames. This increases the objects, concepts, of its repertoire, that subject's 
endowment.  
 
Implications of this theory to the concepts of mind, memory, choice, and knowledge are profound in this 
respect. Maybe it is the case that one can hold different, possibly contradictory thoughts, in one’s head 
and apply, choose, neither? Maybe it is this that marks the uniqueness of the concept of mind, marks our 
humanity? It’s not necessarily that we memorize "things" that reside in the extra-mental world. A finite 
mind cannot possibly retain a potentially infinite amount of images qua information. It is that we acquire 
and determine functions which become available when the conditions in which their application is 
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appropriate are available. Conditions, the environments we actively participate in because we construct 
them, prompt an order of operations utilizing these functions. The zero of these functions are discernible 
to the possessor but not to the context until applied. Their application structure the contexts in which we 
can describe a person's having "knowledge." These functions are evoked in these situations because that 
subject previously utilized that function in order to participate in the construction of that context, thus 
determining that function, indexing function to context.17 This operation expresses the concept of
 memory. These are the contexts we go on to say that those concepts, the functional content of an 
assertion, obtain. The zero of a function is the function itself, which is no one thing until applied so as to
construct the context of its assertion, the object of which is the concept, the functional content, of that 
assertion. This makes sense as a function possessed without input generates no output perceivable by 
others. Yet, that function is still well-defined for the possessor and as such is discernible from other 
functions in the inventory, whose relation expresses the concept mind, here subjectivity, of and for the 
one who constructed and utilizes that function qua object of their endowment. Knowledge and reference, 
then, are artifacts of how we used to conceive this process—see Papineau (2019). A single entity can have 
multiple identities; a single identity can apply to multiple entities. Reference, then, is interminably 
ambiguous and the notion of what counts as knowledge remains foggy at best when based on the former 
notion. Functions are determinable, i.e. computable, while reference is not. (see Gödel’s diagonalization 
proofs, 1931) A finite vessel does not hold infinite things, but with determinate functions, whose use 
construct contexts in which the objects of thought, concepts, obtain, alongside the zero of functions 
representing the function itself, we can make sense of this faculty of subjectivity as a capacity such that 
the concept of mind is displayed by its making infinite use of finite means. 
 
In this way, we share the practices we develop, as states of affairs are co-constructed at the intersection of 
individual context's and whose relation express the world we co-inhabit. We also share the knowledge of 
functions that do not work. As such, all are again accountable for the state of affairs they construct and 
project; averting the predetermination of a state in which the subjectivity of persons cannot emerge for 
one has to trade themselves for that state, a future prefigured from a past determination and thus doomed 
to relive a recurring historical construct. A homogeneous state and a single individual over others are 
equivalent propositions in this respect. Subjectivity is ascertained by an operation indicated by the 
function of an identity or name, (n) whose expression indicates a context or world, (w) and whose 
function relates that name within that world, r(n), becoming that world’s content.iv Here, in vector 
notation, for subjectivity is an operation, not a thing, and therefore only captured in process, in 
movement, the concept of subjectivity is displayed by the ordered-triplet, <w,n,r(n)>=<w,<n,r(n)>>, 
(Gödel, 1940) the world’s content is the function of the names utilized to construct it.   
 
There are many branches within the cultural endowment whose utilization articulates blackness. If a 
singular identity conflated with ethnicity despite the capacity expressing the form of life of a people 
presides over everyone therein, a notion of purity is implied. This purging of that categorical distinction 
does not arise when we come through the use of identifiers by subjectivity, for the same capacity inherent, 
constitutive, of all individuals makes it so that they’re not mutually exclusive. The form of life obtained is 
recursively denumerable, composed of many whose mode of expression reach an affinity with each other. 
The objects produced do not necessarily have to be the same. Within blackness there are many 
“ethnicities.” Blackness is not confined to one nationality or geography. Blackness is not interchangeable 
with any one, for then it would not be blackness.  
 
If blackness is no one thing, then it is that which places systems of categorization into question. As such, 
blackness becomes a perfect candidate for analyzing how categorization and identity come to be by way 
of the various methods of their construction. It, then, is possible to make an account for subjectivity, 
                                                      
17 Situated knowledges qua Standpoint epistemologies have been developed and are key to black feminist scholarship. In this way, we can 
understand epistemologies and their ontological commitments with regard to their ethical deployment without hopeless relativism.  
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which must come prior to identity and the categories to which they are tied, outside of the confines of 
identity concomitant with categorical stipulations. Without the existence of this prior operation qua 
subject, this inner creative capacity, there would be no such thing as identity, as construct or applied 
because constructed by someone else. If subjectivity is in excess of what it produces, then we can also 
account for the emergence of “cultures” and forms of life that function without a reliance on identity and 
persist although unidentified. Subjectivity is characterized by a capacity to make infinite use of finite 
means; the expression of a faculty that produces a digital infinity. As such, this operation is unique.  
 
Black culture being the primary export for some and there being contexts in which Blacks construct the 
only value therein, the logic of the Pessimist’s claim has been shown false in addition to the empirical 
evidence to the contrary. Black is only an identity with an ontological commitment to there existing Black 
individuals. If that identity is cultural death then I say you can have that identity. If it is only true as a 
historical construct, fair, for its formation as such harbors consequences for us today, therefore is a reality. 
However, this position is still revealed as merely as a name in some other system. Blackness has been 
shown to operate outside of identity stipulation for it is a member of a multitude of contexts, that 
stipulation only being one. Its subject sustains itself and lies everywhere for it cannot be placed no one 
where. Naysayers should check the form of life to which they are affiliated, rather than condemn those 
they cannot see because they are no longer a part of it. This, especially so, if they hold themselves, 
according to Frank Wilderson, “transcendent” to that form of life. As transcendent, for assertions are only 
applicable in the contexts they actively construct, their argument is vacuous for the speaker knows not of 
what they speak. It is impossible for there to be absolutely nothing. Otherwise there would be no basis for 
what the Pessimist asserts.  
 
Conflating an operation for any thing was the wrong start. The question in regards to Black subjectivity 
goes beyond retroactive descriptions of its value, whether those valuations are good enough or proof of 
how bad that marker is. The Pessimist course seems to have been drawn up in order to substantiate an 
already held belief. This belief only being attributed to the products of this capacity in the context 
befitting a claim made of one context and over an activity which has the capacity to produce both “good” 
and “bad” but nevertheless cannot be nothing. The very fact that the identifier Black has a function in our 
state of affairs indicates there is something animating that label. Efforts negating what animates that 
identity are dubious because they are self-defeating. The function of these terms indicates that there is 
something using them or something external to the context of their use imposing them. This automatically 
entails that a single label does not exhaust what animates that label in the first place. There are ways to 
build forms of life outside of the categories determined by these identities and assumed uncritically as the 
basis for whatever become the "cultural objects, products, or output of that form of life. The fact that we 
can ask questions about the frameworks imposed on these activities means that alternatives are possible, 
for if there were none, we would not be able to question them at all. If we could not make alternative 
affinities with one another within the forms of life we inhabit and in excess of the identities and their 
contexts we assume, we would not be able to form questions in regards to these supposed categories 
necessary to our being, our membership, in the world. We have shown by some operation how blackness 
from no one thing, or a stipulation of a finite context of finite means, may make infinite use of those 
means which inevitably constructs an alternative state of affairs and challenging that previous system of 
value.  
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i APPENDIX 
 
Operations within workspaces operate under the concept of internal merge within Chomsky’s outline of the 
Minimalist Program for modern linguistics. What appears as “copies” for semantic interpretation in the deep-
structure of what is externalized are the functions of the term initially merged with others. Our model: a,b; 
{a,b};{{a},{a’,b}}; and {f(a),{a’,b}}. The function f is present but not represented in the successor-context. As the 
zero of a function, this can be assumed where f(a)=0 and by set-theoretical construction, ordinals are constituted in 
the following way: f(0)=constant; {0}=“1”, context of assertion; and {0,{0}}={0,{1}}=“2,” defining a relation 
between 0 and 1 in the context labeled “2,” i.e. displaying the structure of function f and making the function whose 
presence was there before construction discernable in the current context. That context is constructed by an f utilized 
from the endowment of the subject constructing the context in which the application of “a” is appropriate, thus 
returning the value qua object of thought, b, that the function of “a” expresses. With the initial assertion of a’s name 
being the construction of the context {a}, appropriate application concerning the context in which that assertion 
obtains is modeled, {{a},{a’,b}} to {{a},{a’,b},{a’’{a’,b}}}, and so on. According to the set-theoretical 
construction of functions, f(a) states that f assigns a to the object b. If "a" obtains, f(a)'s use, in a particular context, 
the domain, {a}, in which its assertion applies, that nominal-function’s use is appropriate because it constructs that 
context by that assertion, returning some value in the context in which the object of thought it names, b, obtains. The 
content of b as the assignment of the successor-context is f(a). That determinate as the function of context and 
assertion is as close we come to the referent of names. Names refer to the context in which their assertion is 
applicable, because appropriate, due to that function's prior and active construction of that initial to successor-
contexts. The function remains embedded. The highest structurally, i.e. the most recent assertion, then is output in 
what that program calls the surface structure of the phrase. 
 
We make sense of this as follows. If “a”=f(0)=name/constant on its own, then “a”={a,{a}}=f(a) the content of the 
tag “a”={f(a)} it’s domain of application. So, {f(a),{f(a),b}}={f(a),{a’,b}} where b=a’ and the determination of f(a) 
given an operation utilizing f(a) is that function’s application implying a context of application. The concept, the 
function of the "function" as the operation expressing b, is determined by the function of "a". We assume “b”={f(b)}
, but in this context b is not the subject exhibited by the use of that function. It is the object of the proposition 
constructed by the function of the name “a.” This shows “a” as a tag for the contexts that the mental object b 
obtains, which is just the successor context in which “a” is appropriate. If “a”=f(0)=A then {A{a’,b}} which says 
f(f(a))=b, so b=a’, the context name in which a’s function can be discerned. What is stated is "a," the successor-
context b is expressed by the function of “a” which does not appear in the initial context because b is not physical. 
The content of the assertion in b is just the function of “a” despite its superficial appearance as b; the subject, the 
function, of that assertion nevertheless remains, expresses, “a” as the structure of the nominal act is a well-defined 
function of the predicament in which the operation of applying that name obtains. We can continue this operation 
via {a,{a,b},{a,{b,c}}}, so that the form {a,{a,x’}}, were x=successor-context, retains the consistent use, function as 
application of the constant, “a” based on von Neumann ordinal construction. Same name, function, the same object, 
argument, for the contexts in which that name applies. Same name, different objects, successor-argument, that fall 
under the category expressed by the function of that name's application to the objects, function qua content of 
context of assertion, having the property denotes by that name in the contexts in which that name use constructs and 
therefore applies. So, b,c,d,... are the objects of thought that fall under the category expressed by the function of that 
nominal constant “a” as those successors b,c, etc. vary in respect to the context that names assertion constructs. 
 
Where b=a’ just makes b part of the domain, the range of determinates of "a" is in accordance with internal merge 
rules. Above, when we showed a,b becoming the set, object of thought whose internal structure is {a,b}, we 
modeled  access to one’s endowment as access to the zero or function of that name. We represented, {f(a),{a,b}}, as
 {f(a),c} for {ab}=c so that “if (ab) then c,” where (ab) implies f(a,b), then c enters an operation with the function 
"a", not a in and of itself. So if f(a,b) then c, then {a,b}=c becomes the object of f, in the domains in which "a" is 
applicable, constructible; f(a,{a,b}}) is just f(c,“a”) with the function of the name being used being well-defined for 
f:={a{a}} the one to one mapping of a to itself which does not violate internal merge. In this way the name “a” 
references the object b which is a stand-in for the internal structure of use {a{a}}, the function f(a) as the relation 
“a” obtains within the context of a it constructs. An expression of the applicable domain which is just the successor-
context that is a built off of the initial use of that name is the function of that originating context of assertion, 
determining that function in the first place as a relation to a. The form, structure, of reference remains intact with 
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each successive use of that name, regardless of the symbols we used to “formalize” for explanatory purposes: 
{a,{a}}={f(a)}=“a”; where our notation is just a handy way of describing the relationships we wish to precisify; and 
as the determinate of a function is its zero, “a”=f(0)=0 so it’s use is {f(a)} and so {f(a),{a,b}}={0, {0,1}}={0,1} 
which sets the function of names use as the context of its assertion. 
 
Thus, in accordance with internal merge, the items entering into the operation are not encoded with information, 
requiring stipulations which cannot be justified. However, their content is the capacity to encode, construct, the 
contexts which we inhabit because those contexts are such due to the functions acquired by this capacity of that 
subject.  
 
ii APPENDIX II 
 
“If c then c” means that an operation over the domain in which c emerges is coherent in the context of its assertion; 
its mode of expression being the modality in which “c” is in that world.  
 
“If c then, if (a and b), then c,” is licensed because it is the case that c given (a and b); and since the operation (a and 
b) expresses the conditions in which c obtains, and “if c then c,” then we are ok.  
Take a and b such that they are comprised of elements,  
a1,a2,...an 
b1,b2,...bn 
 
There must also be an a0 and b0 that say no one thing about either and as such are the labels applied to each A,B. As 
a constant, a(0)=A, function without arguments, cannot be proven in that context because it is the context; what’s 
considered a member of that context is defined on the basis of that identity, thus constructs the context from that null 
starting point. As every context has this zero, the disjoint union of them all entails that contexts are constructed from 
and within a non-empty null. Every statement made about the context of which “a” is part is provable by some 
feature within the domain of a. However, statements in that system are not provable in “a,” for a is expressed by the 
function of that system’s construction. A universally reflexive statement, the name a0, is that unprovable statement 
included in a. The zero of every possible individual in the context of their assertion, it is the label of that context. 
That label by the function of its application creates the successor-context a’ whose validity can be traced, references 
A, the reference frame constituted by the initial assertion of “a.” Valid in its assertion, the context nevertheless 
houses what can be seen as contradictory. This is “a” but not-a, “not a” in and of itself but a function of/in “a” as use 
constructs the context in which that subject participates as the name applied to whatever in that context is “a.” As a,b 
are our initial conditions, our null assumption is that a,b are unified by what is not the case for either: a, b, not-a, 
not-b are all possible in null as the not-operator reveals the method constructing both a or b from all that could be 
the case. As such, those labels represent our understanding that there is a function constructing each collection. A 
label is only such when applied; so for a, there is a label A for all that is a, such that f(a0)=A, as the label of the 
category to which entities have access by some property determined by their possession of some feature. As all that 
is the case intersects at null, the property relation is the zero of the function by which a is constructed. Thus, that 
label says no one thing until applied to the set constructed by some function of application to that entity in the 
context of A. As a rule, that label’s function is indexed to its context of application. We define an operation 
conditionalizing, i.e. constructing, from null what is the case by the relation, “less than or equal to”; an operation 
pairing features of those strings to articulate some particular out of all possible via multiplication.  
The operation, “if a then b,” becomes ab. This results in the construction of the domain ba so that a1=b1, a2=b2...We 
obtain ba which is to say a universal statement of everything extends as far as no one thing, for b is the case just so 
long as a and if not-b, then not-a. However, we have properly defined the conditions in which any thing may 
emerge. When f(a0)=“a” the assertion states no one thing/feature/aspect in particular about a, only everything 
known/about a by c. We say a0 because no one thing is everything that is a, i.e. a’s method of constructing what we 
perceive to be a in the context in which that identity exists. The 0 of that method being the function itself, the object 
of thought that is a’s identity. A name does not encompass or cover all the traits that make up a. Dependent on the 
subject constructing the context, the same subject may be known by the function of another partition of its traits, 
under another name different from the one whose context it was introduced. What we know are functions whose 
 38 
                                                                                                                                                                           
application express our context. The objects of those contexts do not refer to traits but to the features of our world, 
the context in which that function is applicable. Thus, a0 is the only member of a that has no value save for what it 
labels. As the zero of all functions, null is both a part of every articulation constructed and remains apart from them 
for as a function whose operation expresses what is the case, it is not what those things are in and of themselves. A 
function cannot be interchangeable with what it puts to use, e.g. a1...an as there would be contradictions, a is only 
such because it is not-a. What “a” is known as is only such because it is not-a but a property, a label, affixed to a 
placing in within a system of categorization constructed external to the context in which a is asserted.  
Let us say the initial object that emerges is c, making for the context of its assertion described as C. So, “if a and b, 
then c” is such that c is the case, given (ab). C describes some subset of an and bn, whereby c is less than or equal to 
ba. If c=(ab), we know a0 and b0 remain at the tails of the conjunction, the intersection of pair-wise groupings of 
a,b. Let’s make the least assumptions so that (anbn)=c, leaving f(a0) or f(b0). We have conditionalized on some 
partition of the domain b to a constructing the context in which c can be asserted. This is had by some operation over 
a and b.  
The domain is set as ab and an operation over that domain are pairings of a,b up to b, such that,  
(ab)c 
The tautology cc, when c=“c” states that “c”=f(c0)=C(ai,bi) 
Now suppose there is an operation over c and a. No problem, for in the domain ba, what is not-a is f(a0)=“a”. Thus c 
and “a” produce a c-successor in ba. Chomsky’s (2019) issue does not arise for if (ab)c leaves what is not-a or 
not-b or c, because c given (ab), this operation over c encounters not-a but a’s identity. An identity is a function of 
the label tagged to the set a, what is known as “a” in c. The function “a” plays in c is cited by that operation. a0 is not 
a physical trait of a, but “a” is an object of thought. Functions are these objects of thought so that regardless of how 
an “a” may appear, one knows the use of that term within given contexts such that if that object is present, that term 
can be applied to some end. The method of constructing c, then, is f(f(a0),n)=cn. Each c-successor, as output of this 
function, expresses the concept of “c” in the context appropriate for its assertion. Now well-defined, where and 
when f(c) is applicable it participates in the construction of that context. That label obtains because the application of 
that function is valid based on its antecedent applications onward from initial use. This chain of succession is proven 
valid because the operation articulating c, (ab), was so and thus provides the subject of that context as the 
conditions utilized to construct it. Each application, although unprovable in the context of its assertion, can be added 
as an axiom to a successor such that C=0=f(c) as name is constant and C’=C1, C1’=C2, etc. Each context is 
considered more complete than the previous assertion according to Turing Ordinal logics.  
The identity “a” is not a in total, so this operation cites the function “a” plays in the lexicon of c. Now part of c’s 
endowment, this operation represents an internal merge of the functions within c’s lexicon. Reference is to c’s 
endowment whose content is the functions that constructed the conditions in which it emerged. It is from the 
collection of these functions that c can utilize conditions themselves as a tool to articulate an identity appropriate to 
context of assertion, “a” or “b”. What is not-a or not-b, derived from the antecedent of (ab)c in the domain c(ab) 
such that c, given (ab), is a0 or b0. These names of a and b are accessible to c which assigns them a function, 
f(f(…)). So with (ca)  there is no violation for (ca)c, therefore c’ in the domain of c. 
On its own, a name labels no one thing, a function without argument. If applicable everywhere, names determine 
nothing in particular. Exchanging name for what is named loses us the relation between label and entity that we 
wished to maintain. Null being a member of a as an object of thought and apart from a for it is the function over 
null, the set of no one thing, what is null within context, then, is the repertoire of the entities from which what was 
considered “a” were constructed until taken up by c. Null is the domain populated by all articulated and their 
function of construction, thus what makes articulations possible as the zero of those functions: f(0) for a,b,c. . . 
 
The objects available are the lexical functions with which we construct the contextual descriptions of our world. As 
assertion implies context of use, it follows that other subjects are doing the same to and with us, relating our 
contexts and forming the state of affairs we inhabit because we are mutually implicated in its construction. This is 
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how we acquire new names, appropriate to context but not caused by context, and, therefore, not randomly applied. 
This explains how functions are passed down for they are shared in the form of life within states of affairs.  
E.g. One asks someone for a “bottle”; the other does not hand them the actual bottle first named as such, nor do they 
expect to be handed the same exact bottle every time; one trusts other was given the functional content of that term 
so when asked, and that label applies, they “know,” regardless of appearance, the thing whose function is its 
capacity to carry liquid. In other contexts, which would make that term inappropriate, the object is called a vase, the 
functional content of that term is for flowers, although it remains the same physical thing. One refers to the context 
in which that capacity’s label applies, the function of that term defined, and whose argument is the object of thought. 
This does not apply to physical things which can always be put to different uses, obtain contexts in which their 
capacities, uses, are different, thus obtaining different names.  
With each subject possessing an operation for the construction of contexts from the finite means available, this 
operation produces infinite arrangements of functions, resulting in an order of “operations”/applications that 
produces different realities as constructs from the finite material of actual world. I feel this is how we begin to 
conceive of dealing with the interface problem, how the activity of our thoughts are actualized in the extra mental 
world. Mainly, inspired by the nondeterminate but finite things composing the actual world, through this recursive 
capacity to make infinite use of finite means, we develop a finite lexicon of functions qua objective thoughts. It is 
implausible that we inhabit every context possible from which to experience the actual world. Through this activity, 
our thoughts interact with the things of the world as we find them. 
Most models constructed by our activities can be proven inconsistent. Not a cause for worry, but motivation to 
create alternatives. The ones that are valid, most often say very little at all, opening us up to what we do not know. 
Logic seems to lead to openings, rather than closures. As a famous philosopher once said, “the world is everything 
that is the case.” What is the case are beliefs we have decided are true; facts as named objects of knowledge. 
However, facts can be arranged to tell a multitude of stories, not all of which are true and mostly undecidable. If it 
cannot be proven consistent, we can take that unprovable statement as an axiom to construct a successor-context. 
The assertion of that axiom being the name of that successor-context, seemingly more complete than the last, 
changing our states of affairs for the better. Just because one identity can be asserted and another can as well it does 
not necessarily follow that both are valid together. Each context of applicable assertion regarding them separately 
does not mean a context can be constructed in which they both are applicable. Just the same, if two identities are 
asserted together, it does not necessarily follow that they can be asserted on their own. Knowledge on its own, the 
zeroes of functions, do not count for very much until applied; either in contexts in which we understand what is the 
case, because that context is shared with others who are also constructing it; or applied within a system of statements 
constructed within that body of knowledge for which a contradiction proves the system constructed invalid. If 
invalidated, this does not negate what the knowledge therein. Athena’s helm made her invisible, yet her wisdom was 
ready for action, her tools, sharpened, could not be taken away. 
 
A name, whose content alone is its function, if held absolute, as universally applicable, determines no one particular 
thing. Black-ness is applicable across contexts and thus remains functional, no one thing in any one context and, 
thus, can be expressed utilizing anything. What is made homogeneous attempts to make Black-identity its object. 
Thus the use of that term implies some context of assertion in which it applies to the objects with which it defines 
itself. E.g. “w”=f(w0) if constant; if held universally homogeneous, w→0 asserts that it is something other than a 
function, for tis dominance is defined by b’s assertion as, 0→b, if no one thing then b, an operation producing the 
value which constitutes, thereby defines, w’s position. Thus, if w=“b”, then w=f(b0). Defining White-identity as a 
universal constant reveals its inconsistency, for the class of all Blacks, B-identity, is a function without argument. 
Thus “White,” as sole object, is only applicable in one context. As such, w wipes itself out for all that is produced is 
b-ness, i.e. what is not-w. This is not to say that blackness produces “white”-ness, but that White-identity has no 
means of production on its own; we only see w’s violent attempt to lay claim to some entity perpetually on the 
move. Thus, 1=0; or taking Fanon’s notion, Black given White (B/W), since White names Black-identity, 0/1 which 
is 0. Only blackness survives the operation; White-identity is unsustainable. Homogeneity over no one thing, 1/0, 
generates an infinite number of issues for the system of categorization. Either White supremacy is inconsistent, or 
blackness is infinitely generative; the disjoint union of both encompasses our current state. Made interchangeable 
with those things, it cannot stand on its own, thus applicable in one and only one context if at all and, therefore, is 
empty. Its assertion cannot justify itself for lack of that justification having a means of justification—dominant over 
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everything, therefore, no one particular thing, which does not say anything about dominance. Blackness, having to 
produce value across states of affairs, by definition an operation, not a thing, has a means of expression, a 
subjectivity constructing the constituents of the various categories under which it operates by the properties apparent 
in the contexts in which it is asserted. From no one thing, in light of historical antecedents, blackness is not empty 
for full of functional capacities, the objects of thought expressing its subject in those contexts and requires no 
external justification because it is exhibited by the means of construction.  
 
Names have no value in themselves, but as such create value because they are is exportable, lending themselves to 
racialized capitalist regimes. Who controls the name, controls the value. However, possessing that name is not 
valuable itself. What is attributed to that name is valued, its function and, therefore, the contexts to which it’s 
exported as an object for consumption. For those whose form of life is this function—animating these terms, 
indicating the operation whose function expresses the concept of what it is to be in that context—this does not prove 
harmful. It shows that that function can be put to uses against regimes of control or, in the least, circumvent these 
systems. Functions themselves are illegible in that system, as zeroes they are present but not represented in context. 
Only their products appear. As such, representation is not everything. Subjectivity is in excess of categorization. For 
those which forms of life are rendered a thing, they consume the means of theirs or others subordination. 
 
iii APPENDIX III 
 
From this study we can draw a tree diagram of the structure of states of affairs in order to show how this concept 
comes to fruition. Let’s take a (C)ontext created by (ID)entity assertion. With the initial assertion of an ID, the ID is 
identical to context, for its use constructs the context in which it is applicable. So,  
 
C/ID 
/\ 
ID C1 
     /\ 
      ID C2 
           /\ 
                 . . . 
 
C can take another C for the same ID or the initial assertion of another ID=C,  
 
C/ID 
/\ 
     ID C/ID1 
    /\ 
      ID1 C1 
 
We will specify the concept of this operation as the following. Take a (w)orld as context, a (n)ame as identity, and 
the (r)elation that name has within context to be that name’s function. The function of a name indicates its meaning 
in and only in the context of that identities assertion. The construction rules above are based on the idea that 
subjectivity is a vector. Its initial state is no one thing, thus basis for everything. As such, a subject expressed by 
some operation s, at s(0) is 0=w-n+r, where w=n-r(n)—see Sarrus’ rule and Laplace’s co-factor expansion for matrix 
notation <+, −,+>. This is the case as r(0) entails that the assertion of a name/ID indicates the world/context of its 
assertion. From this notation, using the cross product multiplication of vectors we can model how states of affairs 
emerge by a recursively constructed relation between the contexts of assertion for two or more identities, whose 
function indicate subjects which may or may not be of the same endowment but, nevertheless, participate in the 
construction of a state of affairs. This cross product entails the set, here state, in which the disjoint union of the pair-
wise coupling of its constituents, i.e. set-recursive multiplication of these well-ordered triples, is the structure 
composed by the affairs of various subjects. The inner relation of the three aspects of a subject paired with others 
displays the operation of subjectivity projecting an identity in the context in which it is applicable, because actively 
constructing that context. So we have,  
 
 
w 
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/\ 
   n  r(n) 
 
In this way, a name/ID is such that its use indicates the context of its assertion and that identities relation, i.e. 
function, within and to that context. Therefore the content of the assertion of an identity is its function, not some 
thing.  Thus a name is <n,r(n)>=<n,<r,n>>. E.g., an ‘I’ utterance creates initial context of use and when used again 
refers to that initial context, thus relating name to that context. The name, a function of that context. As a function of 
context application is appropriate in context of that line because successors in that line, by that ID utterance, 
captures the contexts of use as object(s) of that proposition. Subjects considered vectors, vectors having direction 
and magnitude, display the operation as subjectivity, not some other thing. The context they inhabit is initially 
determined at its zero,  
0=w-n+r(n) 
So for our tree above, r(n)=n-w standing for an initial state r(0). ID has no scope on its own until applied. This can 
be simplified so as to state that w, the initial context, is 
w=n-r(n) 
where w=0 means that the name or ID of that context is yet to be applied.  
When applied, n=w+r(n), which is to say the context indicated by its assertion and it’s function constructs that 
context.  
By our diagrams we see how finite contextual material output becomes input for the expression of a successor 
context in which that ID is appropriate for assertion. Take a context A. The self-reflexive citation of A cannot be 
proven in A, but if added as an axiom to A creates a set in which A is a member, a successor-context A’. This 
statement can be proven in that successor context. The context that captures all those contexts represents a separate 
context and so on. Each addition of a self-reflexive axiom creates a new ordinal in accordance with Turing logics 
with the hope that each operation makes that context more complete. For example,  
 
An’=An+1, Ak=B0 
 
for all n<k, so that A0, B0, etc. are unified in null. If n=k, the context marked as such means that the ID, i.e. axiom, is 
applicable everywhere, therefore nowhere, so that k is not equal to any one n. An initial objection would be that a 
context can never be determined complete, only work towards completion. This is no problem for us, for to assume 
that a context is complete makes something which is inherently an operation, subjectivity, interchangeable with that 
context, a thing, therefore rendering what by definition is not a thing homogeneous and static. If a subject comes to 
the end of its operations, this marks the end of its life, so what does it care if the context is complete. However, by 
virtue of our discussion of endowments, if a single subject is made interchangeable with its identity, marking the end 
of its life, the form of life constructed does not end for subjects utilizing that endowment actively and continue to 
construct the form of life expressed by their operation over and within that endowment for Ak=B0, thus B’ contains 
A, even though a1b1. Considering blackness in this way, one of its identities may be an historical object, but 
blackness qua subjectivity is an immediate thing, in excess of any one historical frame. Its expressions are 
appropriate to historical as well as contemporary contexts but not necessarily caused by contextualized reference 
frames, for its operations actively creates contexts.  
 
Subjectivity, then, is an inner creative capacity for everyone, therefore no one in particular. It creates particular 
utterances indicative of the individual it represents, dependent upon context and based on the infinite use of finite 
means appropriate to the context inhabited. The same capacity, different context, entails different output, creating 
unique individuals based on a restriction due to the finite means to articulate that individual within that context. 
Nominal-identity is always context dependent. Same subject appears different because contexts are different.  
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Regarding blackness, the use of any ID indicates the context in which it is appropriate to assert that ID because its 
use constructs that context. The indication of the operation constructing that context is the subject. Therefore 
blackness, the function of that operation, cannot be void for there are a multitude of context in which it inhabits and 
creates under different IDs. The same name can come under different functions. Just because one has access to a 
context because of their participating in the construction of the state of affairs of which it is a part, does not mean 
that individuals have access to each other’s endowments. Functions being the content of their respective assertions, a 
function outside of its endowment fails. Different individuals may participate in the construction of same 
endowment, but only by way of an affinity of operations making for composite functions over IDs created by pair 
wise set of input/output claims. In this we have the creation of a collective form of life. 
 
iv APPENDIX IV 
 
In a 2019 lecture Saul Kripke gave at the University of London, he would state that subject’s use their conditions. 
Those conditions describe the speaker. I say, the operation of that speaker’s utilization of a name whose functional 
content is an assertion of itself is the context of these statements. These can be linked to the previous context of 
assertion all the way back to the initial baptism, the dubbing of that name. The function of that initial tag marks the 
occasion of its use; that is when that function obtained the basis for its arguments, which no longer need be present 
in order to utilize that name. Use refers to the context which obtained that object of thought. Thus, fulfilling the 
conditions of “referring” making it so recourse is only to the reference frame constructed, not some  extra-mental 
thing that may or may not be there in the long succession of that names use.  
 
Kripke’s example of being alone in a room and using the name Gödel provides a great case-study. Description of the 
traits of Gödel are context dependent. The use of that name does not necessitate that Gödel actually be in the room. 
The statement describes no extra-mental thing, only the context of its assertion, “the one who formalized the 
incompleteness theorem.” In this empty room there is no way to “know” thereby apply that name to the physical 
thing that is Gödel. The context of assertion has no thing there save a function relating assertion to context. Within 
that room, the assertion is appropriate because the functional content of that name is applied in the context of 
mathematical logic, not a thing. We cannot say that the speaker “knows” the actual person Gödel, nor does the 
speaker describe any predicament in which they and Gödel were together by the use of that term. The former implies 
that physical acquaintance is not necessary to use of term, only the possession of a function of the term is needed 
which also does not entail that the arguments of context and application both obtain that function indicating 
appropriate use. The latter makes use ambiguous because it refers not to one object but two, Gödel and speaker, 
revealing that there must be some connection between term and context, not term and thing.  
 
It just so happens to be correct but continued use of this name does not entail access to the citational chain which 
licenses its use. There is no way to ascertain the context in which its assertion was applicable for the speaker does 
not share the functional content of that chain because not introduced nor actively participating in the ordinally 
constructed contexts referring back to the occasion when the one tagged Gödel did what they did at that time. This 
brings up the point that the functional content is evoked with each utterance of that name up through the citational 
chain. Thus, the context of assertion is empty, the speaker does not truly “refer” to any one thing save to themselves. 
Their assertion extends to that and only that context making the identity asserted contingently true, flying in the face 
of identity theory but proving that the act of referring and identity are not the same thing. So the use of the name 
obtained no object save its context, however, we can show how, when, and why it would be valid. It is only valid 
when one is introduced and actively participates in the state of affairs in which they have access to the function 
relating assertion with its context of application. In looking at names as only having functional content, and how 
assertion implies context, i.e. the reference frame qua categorical system employed that indexes assertion to the 
context constructed, we see how systems of reference and their ontological implication, e.g. racial identity, evolve 
and, when their deployment is proven inconsistent, can change.  
 
